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Europe regulates data privacy against violations coming from 
the private sector more strictly than the U.S.1  The EU Directive 
95/46/EC has led to the implementation of a sophisticated system 
of data privacy regulation having strong enforcement 
mechanisms. 2   The European Commission has submitted a 
proposal for a new regulation, which updates data privacy law 
protection strengthening individual rights and foreseeing 
important penalties.3  Both the existing Directive and the Proposed 
                                                     
*  Lecturer, School of Law, National University of Ireland, Galway.  The 
author would like to thank the participants in the Roundtable “Constitutionalism 
Across Borders in the Struggle Against Terrorism” of the Research Group on 
Constitutional Responses to Terrorism, of the International Association of 
Constitutional Law, held at Harvard Law School on March 6–7, 2014, for 
contributions of materials on the topic and interesting discussions.  Special thanks 
go to David Cole, Vicki Jakson, Konrad Lanchmayer, Valerio Lubello, Valsamis 
Mitsilegas, Kim Lane Scheppele, Mark Tushnet and Arianna Vedaschi.  
1  See generally Ioanna Tourkochoriti, The Snowden Revelations, the Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership and the Divide Between U.S.-E.U. in Data Privacy 
Protection, 36 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 161 (2014).  
2  Directive 95/46/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 
October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of 
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 
[hereinafter Data Protection Directive], available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/95-46-ce/dir1995-
46_part1_en.pdf (laying out regulations for protecting data privacy). 
3  Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data 
and on the Free Movement of Such Data (General Data Protection Regulation), COM 
(2012) 11 final (Jan. 25, 2012) [hereinafter Proposed Regulation], available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/document/review2012/com_2012_11_en.pdf (proposing “a new legal 
framework for the protection of personal data”).  
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Regulation do not apply to activities concerning “national 
security.”4  The EU has succeeded through negotiations to level up 
the standards of data privacy protection in the private sector in the 
U.S. through the Safe Harbor Agreement.5  This agreement also 
foresees an exemption of its application in case of national security, 
public interest, or law enforcement requirements.6 
The European Regulation of privacy is indirectly affecting the 
access of public authorities to private data by limiting the 
possibility of private actors to collect and store this data, which 
they will be required to transmit to surveillance authorities.7  A 
legal tool elaborated for a specific purpose to limit the access of 
private actors to personal information can operate protectively for 
another purpose:  to limit access of the state to the same 
information.  The Directive goes as far as prohibiting profiling 
altogether and establishing a “right to be forgotten.”8  It thus can 
limit the amount of information that private actors collect, which 
then results in the state authorities limiting their “data mining” 
potentiality. 
Surveillance transcends the public/private divide, 9  as the 
PRISM program revealed recently gives public authorities access to 
information collected by the private sector.  This paper analyzes 
the existing protection through the Safe Harbor Agreement and the 
Proposed Regulation, which strengthens the legal framework of 
                                                     
4  See Tourkochoriti, supra note 1 (noting that the Directive is inapplicable in 
certain cases); Data Protection Directive, supra note 2, art. 3(2) (clarifying that the 
Directive does not “apply to the processing of personal data . . . in any case to 
processing operations concerning public security, defence, State security”); see also 
Proposed Regulation, supra note 3, art. 2(2)(a) (the Proposed Regulation foresees 
explicitly that it does not apply to the processing of personal data “in the course of 
an activity which falls outside the scope of Union Law, in particular concerning 
national security”). 
5  See Dep’t of Commerce, Safe Harbor Privacy Principles, EXPORT.GOV (July 21, 
2000) [hereinafter Safe Harbor Privacy Principles], 
http://export.gov/safeharbor/eu/eg_main_018475.asp (explaining the Directive 
mandates that personal data transfers to non-EU countries must provide an 
“adequate” level of protection). 
6  Id. at 1 (stating the EU required “’adequacy standard’” on personal data 
transfers may be limited “to the extent necessary to meet national security, public 
interest, or law enforcement requirements”). 
       7    See infra Part 3.1. 
8   Id. 
9  Cf. Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 
1935 (2013) (arguing “public and private surveillance are simply related parts of 
the same problem, rather than wholly discrete.”). 
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privacy against collection of data by the private sector.  It analyzes 
how limiting the possibility of private actors to collect information 
may have an impact on what information the state collects from 
private actors.  It then suggests ways of interpreting the national 
security exception existing both in the EU Regulation and the 
Transatlantic agreements in a way as to narrow its scope, in 
reference to the ECHR in Europe and to the ICCPR.  It also points 
out the need for signing a new treaty to fill legal gaps in the 
protection of transfer of data through Cloud computing.  The 
prima facie legal gap in the protection of privacy concerning Cloud 
computing can be filled in reference to other international 
instruments protecting privacy. 
The transatlantic flow of data is of critical importance for both 
the economy of the EU and the U.S.10  Following the revelations, 
the European Commission made clear that the standards of data 
protection will not be part of the on-going negotiations for a 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, 11  while the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the European Parliament insists 
that a separate agreement is necessary on strong data privacy 
protections.12  The Commission refuses to negotiate data protection 
with the U.S. as, in its opinion, this is a “fundamental right” which 
is not negotiable.13 
                                                     
10  See, e.g., EUR. CTR. FOR INT’L POL. ECON., THE ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF 
GETTING DATA PROTECTION RIGHT: PROTECTING PRIVACY, TRANSMITTING DATA, 
MOVING COMMERCE 7 (2013) (noting that if services and cross-border data flows 
were to be disrupted as a consequence of the discontinuity of binding corporate 
rules, model contract clauses and the Safe Harbor, the negative impact on EU 
GDP could reach -0.8% to -1.3% and EU services exports to the U.S. would drop 
by -6.7% due to the loss of competitiveness). 
11  Press Release IP/13/1166, Eur. Comm’n, European Commission Calls on 
the U.S. to Restore Trust in EU-U.S. Data Flows (Nov. 27, 2013) [hereinafter Press 
Release IP/13/1166], available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-
1166_en.htm (calling for actions to “restore trust in data flows between the EU 
and the U.S.” and to “maintain the continuity of data flows”).  
12  See Eur. Parliament Comm. on Foreign Affairs, Draft Working Document on 
Foreign Policy Aspects of the Inquiry on Electronic Mass Surveillance of EU Citizens, at 
3 (Nov. 4, 2013) available at http://database.statewatch.org/article.asp?aid=32888 
[Working Document on Mass Surveillance] (noting “it is crucial that agreement on 
strong data privacy protections is achieved separately from the [Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership].”). 
13  See Memorandum MEMO/13/1059, Eur. Comm’n, Restoring Trust in EU-
US Data Flows – Frequently Asked Questions, at 8 (Nov. 27, 2013) [hereinafter 
European Commission Memo] ("‘Data protection is not red tape or a tariff.  It is a 
fundamental right and as such it is not negotiable.’”) (quoting Vice President 
Viviane Reding from a prior speech).  Viviane Reding, Vice President, Eur. 
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The ECtHR has issued a number of decisions on surveillance 
issues, some of them more protective than others.14  The same court 
has elaborated jurisprudence concerning the conditions under 
which European states can maintain databases on their citizens for 
surveillance and law enforcement purposes. 15  Furthermore, 
following the revelations, the Advocate General of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union issued a very promising opinion on 
the Data Retention Directive for the purpose of the investigation, 
detection, and prosecution of serious crime.16 
Much of the foreign intelligence information collected by the 
NSA is shared with the governments of many other nations.17 
While the governments of the Member States are promoting 
cooperation with the U.S. on intelligence matters, the EU officials 
show a greater sensibility in favor of protecting data privacy.18  
Within the Member States, Europeans are split between the need of 
satisfying the negative reactions of their constituents to the 
revelations and using the result of their cooperation with the U.S. 
for their own security purposes. 
One method of collecting Internet data is the PRISM program, 
which collects data from companies like Google, Apple and 
Facebook if the communications contain certain terms chosen by 
                                                     
Comm’n, SPEECH 13/867, Towards a More Dynamic Transatlantic Area of 
Growth and Investment (Oct. 29, 2013).  
14  See Klass v. Germany, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 14 (1978) analyzed infra Part 3.3 
(pointing out the court does not recognize high standards of protection).  
15  See infra Part 3.3. 
16 Digital Rights Ireland Ltd. v. Minister for Commc’ns, Marine, and Natural 
Res. et al., [2013] (H. Ct.) (Ir.) [hereinafter Digital Rights Ireland Ltd.], available at 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=145562&pag
eIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=187576 (ruling 
on the “circumstances in which it is constitutionally possible for the European 
Union to impose a limitation on the exercise of fundamental rights”); see also 
Monika Ermert, EU Data Retention Might Not Be Proportional to Risks (July 9, 2013), 
http://policyreview.info/articles/news/eu-data-retention-might-not-be-
proportional-risks/170 (during the oral hearing of the case in July, the judges 
seemed willing to confirm this approach). 
17  See Justin Cremer, Denmark is One of the NSA’s ‘9-Eyes’, COPENHAGEN POST 
(Nov. 4, 2013, 10:10 AM), http://cphpost.dk/news/denmark-is-one-of-the-nsas-
9-eyes.7611.html (stating the NSA is reported to have a close relationship with the 
UK, Canada, New Zealand and Australia, called the ‘5-Eyes’, but a more restricted 
intelligence-sharing relationship exists between Denmark, Norway, the 
Netherlands and France, which altogether compose the ‘9-Eyes.’  The NSA has a 
less intimate relationship with Germany, Sweden, Belgium, Spain, and Italy, 
which adds up to the ‘14 eyes’ with the other nine countries.). 
       18    Press Release IP/13/1166, supra note 11.  
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the NSA.19  The program gathers “massive data on life-styles in 
order to elaborate patterns and profiles concerning political 
attitudes and economic choices.” 20   Another method collecting 
Internet content is “upstream” collection, which gives the NSA 
direct access to the data packets traveling through domestic and 
international fiber optic cables.21  “Data is copied from both public 
and private networks . . . and from central exchanges which switch 
Internet traffic between the major carriers, through agreements 
negotiated with . . . the operating companies . . . .”22  The NSA is 
reported to be copying all emails and text messages with one end 
outside of the United States in order to pull out communications 
                                                     
19  See Barton Gellman & Laura Poitras, U.S., British Intelligence Mining Data 
from Nine U.S. Internet Companies in Broad Secret Program, WASH. POST (June 7, 
2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/usintelligence-mining-
data-from-nine-us-internet-companies-in-broad-secret-
program/2013/06/06/3a0c0da8-cebf-11e2-8845-d970ccb04497_story.html 
(discussing a top-secret document discovered by The Washington Post that 
reveals a program, code-named PRISM, which allows the NSA to hack into the 
central servers of nine leading Internet companies, “extracting audio and video 
chats, photographs, e-mails, documents, and connection logs that enable analysts 
to track foreign targets”). 
20  See Note by Caspar Bowden, Directorate General for Internal Policies, Eur. 
Parliament, Policy Department C: Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs: The 
US Surveillance Programmes and Their Impact on EU Citizens’ Fundamental 
Rights, at 8 (2013) (noting that by “gathering massive data on life-styles in order 
to elaborate patterns and profiles concerning political attitudes and economic 
choices, PRISM seems to have allowed an unprecedented scale and depth in 
intelligence gathering. . . .”). 
21  See Craig Timberg, NSA Slide Shows Surveillance of Undersea Cables, THE 
WASH. POST (July 10, 2013), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-07-
10/business/40480665_1_nsa-slide-prism (discussing a classified NSA slide that 
describes “Upstream” data collection as accessing “’communications on fiber 
cables and infrastructure as data flows past.’”); see also Jennifer Valentino-DeVries 
& Siobhan Gorman, What You Need to Know on New Details of NSA Spying, WALL 
ST. J. (Aug. 20, 2013), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324108204579025222244858490.h
tml (stating that “Upstream” data collection involves splitting fiber optic lines at a 
junction, and then copying the traffic to an NSA processing system that filters 
through the data based on NSA parameters); Brett Max Kaufman, A Guide to What 
We Know About the NSA’s Dragnet Searches of Your Communications, AM. CIVIL 
LIBERTIES UNION (Aug. 9, 2013), https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-
security/guide-what-we-now-know-about-nsas-dragnet-searches-your-
communications (contrasting “Upstream” data collection with PRISM, noting that 
the former “involves the collection of communications—both their metadata and 
their content—as they pass through undersea fiber-optic cables.”). 
22 See Bowden, supra note 20, at 13 (2013) (describing the “Upstream” 
surveillance program). 
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that match certain “selectors” relevant to foreign intelligence.23  
The agency has collaborated with domestic telecommunications 
companies to give it the ability to directly access up to 
approximately seventy-five percent of U.S. communications.24  A 
program called XKEYSCORE allows the government to search 
essentially any Internet activity using approved search terms, and 
has vast capabilities, feeding much of it to other specialized 
databases.25  It enables an analyst to discover “strong selectors” 
(search parameters which identify or can be used to extract data 
precisely about a target and to look for “anomalous events”).26  
Because the amount of data that is scanned and stored is vast, it 
can only be stored for a limited time, three to five days for content 
and thirty days for metadata; other databases receiving 
information from XKEYSCORE keep the content of emails and 
email metadata for up to five years.27  BULLRUN is the codename 
                                                     
23  See Charlie Savage, NSA Said to Search Content of Messages to and from U.S., 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 8, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/08/us/broader-
sifting-of-data-abroad-is-seen-bynsa.html?ref=todayspaper&pagewanted=all 
(describing how NSA officials must first collect all cross-border data, and a 
computer searches through the data using “selectors” or other keywords to 
selectively store data for human analysts to review later). 
24  See Valentino-DeVries & Gorman, supra note 21 (revealing that the NSA 
can access 75% of the telecommunications traffic in the U.S. through U.S. 
telecommunications companies, including not only metadata but the actual 
content of online communications). 
25  See Glenn Greenwald, XKeyscore: NSA Tool Collects ‘Nearly Everything a 
User Does on the Internet,’ THE GUARDIAN (July 31, 2013, 8:56 AM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/31/nsa-top-secret-program-
online-data (describing how NSA analysts can use XKEYSCORE and other 
systems to mine enormous databases by completing a simple on-screen form 
giving only a broad justification for the search); XKeyscore Presentation (Feb. 25, 
2008) THE GUARDIAN [hereinafter XKeyscore Presentation], available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/jul/31/nsa-xkeyscore-
program-full-presentation (revealing slides from a presentation explaining the 
capabilities of XKeyscore).  
26  Greenwald, supra note 25; XKeyscore Presentation, supra note 25, at 15.   
27  XKeyscore Presentation, supra note 25, at 2, 17; see Marc Ambinder, What’s 
XKEYSCORE?, THE WEEK (July 31, 2013, 3:58 PM), 
http://theweek.com/article/index/247684/whats-xkeyscore (describing 
XKEYSCORE as something that doesn’t collect data, but rather “a series of user 
interfaces, backend databases, servers and software that selects certain types of 
metadata that the NSA has ALREADY collected using other methods.”); see also 
21% of the Database Query Errors in NSA Report Involved the Phone Internet Dragnet 
Database, EMPTYWHEEL (Aug. 16, 2013), 
https://www.emptywheel.net/2013/08/16/21-of-the-database-query-errors-in-
1q-2012-involved-the-phone-dragnet-database/ (noting that 21% of the database 
query errors used by the NSA involve the MARINA database, which stores 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol36/iss2/3
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for another program of the last decade, that can break into 
encryption technologies,28 while information which recently came 
to light on the NSA’s TAO hacking unit reveals they have been 
infiltrating computers around the world.29 
          The U.S. government has established several data centers 
to aggregate, compare, data-mine, and analyze information.  The 
National Counterterrorism Center operates under the Director of 
National Intelligence and pulls employees from other federal 
agencies, like the FBI, the CIA, the Department of Agriculture and 
the U.S. Capitol Police.30  The Center’s mission is to “analyze and 
integrate” all terrorism and counterterrorism intelligence, 
collecting data from all other agencies.31  It also assesses data from 
international travel-related datasets, immigration benefits-related 
datasets, and financial-related datasets.32  The FBI’s Investigative 
                                                     
Internet data). 
28  See James Ball, Julian Borger & Glenn Greenwald, Revealed: How US and 
UK Spy Agencies Defeat Internet Privacy and Security, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 5, 2013), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchq-encryption-codes-
security (revealing an NSA classification guide which states, "’Project Bullrun 
deals with NSA's abilities to defeat the encryption used in specific network 
communication technologies.  Bullrun involves multiple sources, all of which are 
extremely sensitive.’"). 
29  See SPIEGEL Staff, Inside TAO: Documents Reveal Top NSA Hacking Unit, 
SPIEGEL ONLINE (Dec. 29, 2013, 9:18 AM), 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-nsa-uses-powerful-toolbox-in-
effort-to-spy-on-global-networks-a-940969.html (revealing that the NSA’s TAO 
hacking unit is considered the agency’s “top secret weapon” capable of 
maintaining its own covert network that hacks into computers around the world). 
30  National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-235, 61 Stat. 496 (codified as 
amended at 50 U.S.C. § 15 (2007) [hereinafter National Security Act of 1947] 
(establishing a system for national security); U.S. Dep’t of Justice et al., 
Memorandum of Understanding Between the Intelligence Community, Federal 
Law Enforcement Agencies, and the Department of Homeland Security 
Concerning Information Sharing (2003), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/mou-infoshare.pdf; see also Exec. Order No. 
13354, 69 Fed. Reg. 53589 (Aug. 27, 2004), available at 
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2004-09-01/pdf/04-20050.pdf (stating that the 
Center is also given the authority to “receive, retain, and disseminate 
information” from any domestic government agency or other source; each agency 
that holds terrorism information must provide the Center with access to the 
information). 
     31     National Security Act of 1947, supra note 30; see generally Rachel Levinson-
Waldman, What the Government Does With Americans’ Data, Brennan Ctr. for Justice 
at N.Y.U. L. Sch., at 20 (2013). 
32  See Guidelines for Access, Retention, Use, and Dissemination by the 
National Counterterrorism Center and Other Agencies of Information in Datasets 
Containing Non-Terrorism Information, at 12 (2012), available at 
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Data Warehouse conducts data mining, which it collects from the 
Departments of Treasury, State and Homeland Security, the 
Bureau of Prisons, and non-governmental sources.33  The National 
Security Agency Data Center also collects material.34  A series of 
statutes and executive orders facilitate the sharing of information 
among all levels of government and private sector (ISE-SAR).35  For 
the information to be retained an assessment is required by an 
analyst that there is a “potential terrorism nexus,” which is 
established by the federal government.36  The criterion used is that 
which would make a “reasonable person” suspicious.37   
 
                                                     
http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/intel/nctc_guidelines.pdf (according to the 
2012 Guidelines to the authority, the NCTC can disseminate information that 
“reasonably appears to be necessary to understand or assess terrorism 
information”); see generally Levinson-Waldman, supra note 31, at 20. 
33  See Report on the Investigative Data Warehouse, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER 
FOUND., § 4 (Apr. 2009) [hereinafter Report on IDW], 
https://www.eff.org/issues/foia/investigative-data-warehouse-report 
(describing the FBI’s Investigative Data Warehouse as a massive centralized 
online repository for “intelligence and investigative data”); see also Fed. Bureau of 
Investigation, Dep’t of Justice, Request for Records Disposition Authority, N1-65-
10-31 (2010), available at http://www.archives.gov/records-
mgmt/rcs/schedules/departments/department-of-justice/rg-0065/n1-065-10-
031_sf115.pdf (stating that the “Investigative Data Warehouse (lDW) is a 
centralized repository for copies of intelligence and investigative data with 
advanced search capabilities” providing users with “information needed to 
successfully accomplish the FBI's counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and law 
enforcement missions.”). 
34  Levinson-Waldman, supra note 31, at 22 (2013); James Bamford, The NSA Is 
Building the Country’s Biggest Spy Center (Watch What You Say), WIRED (Mar. 15, 
2012, 7:24 PM) www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/03/ff_nsadatacenter/all/1.  
35  Levinson-Waldman, supra note 31, at 23 (2013).  
36  See Information Sharing Environment (ISE) Functional Standard (FS) 
Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Version 1.5 (ISE-FS-200), at 2 (2009) 
[hereinafter Information Sharing Environment (ISE) Functional Standard], 
available at http://nsi.ncirc.gov/documents/ISE-FS-200_ISE-
SAR_Functional_Standard_V1_5_Issued_2009.pdf (detailing that an Information 
Sharing Environment-Suspicious Activity Report is a Suspicious Activity Report 
“that has been determined, pursuant to a two-part process, to have a potential 
terrorism nexus (i.e., to be reasonably indicative of criminal activity associated 
with terrorism.”)); see also Levinson-Waldman, supra note 31, at 24 (stating that 
“[c]ertain criminal behaviors are considered automatic indicators of a terrorism 
nexus—[such as] attempting to enter a restricted site,” while other non-criminal 
behavior can still “trigger a finding of a potential terrorism nexus” if the activity 
“would make a ‘reasonable person’ suspicious.”). 
37  Information Sharing Environment (ISE) Functional Standard, supra note 
36, at 29–30 (defining potential criminal or non-criminal activity that would 
require additional investigation).  
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1. BASIC DIFFERENCES BETWEEN EU AND U.S. DATA REGULATION 
REGIMES AND THE SAFE HARBOR AGREEMENT 
 
 There are many differences between the EU and U.S. data 
protection regimes that derive principally from the trust of 
Europeans towards the state to regulate the private sector 
containing the data and the distrust towards the state in the U.S.38  
The differences concern first, the fundamental presumptions 
concerning the processing of personal data.  The presumption in 
the U.S. is that the processing of personal data is permitted unless 
it causes harm or is limited by law.39  The opposite presumption is 
dominant in the EU where processing is prohibited unless there is 
a legal basis that allows it.40  Second, the limits on contractual 
freedom differ.  The EU Directive does not allow a data subject to 
enter into an agreement that permits a data controller from 
derogating fundamentally from their basic duties on the basis of 
Article 6 principles relating to data quality and Article 12 
concerning access rights of the data subject to the data.41  The U.S. 
data protection regime affords contract and market mechanisms 
greater latitude in setting data privacy standards and permits a 
significant degree of contractual “override” of the privacy-related 
interests of data subjects.  Third, there are differences concerning 
the coverage of protection.  The Directive is broad in scope and 
applies to the processing of personal data in the private and public 
sectors.  U.S. law contains only limited sector-specific protections 
for sensitive information.  It does not generally restrict automated 
processing.42  Fourth, there are differences in the definition of the 
                                                     
38  Tourkochoriti, supra note 1, at 170 (interpreting the divergence in systems 
to be due to a difference in how citizens understand the role of the state).  
39  Paul M. Schwartz, The EU-U.S. Privacy Collision: A Turn to Institutions and 
Procedures, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1966, 1978–79 (2013) (discussing the U.S. approach 
that is largely unregulated, giving companies freedom to “try new kinds of data 
processing”). 
40  Data Protection Directive, supra note 2, arts. 1, 5, 6, 7 (regulating the 
processing of personal data). 
41  Id.; see also Lee A. Bygrave, Transatlantic Tensions on Data Privacy 6 
(Transworld: The Transatlantic Relationship and the Future Global Governance, 
Working Paper No. 19, Apr. 2013), available at 
http://www.iai.it/pdf/Transworld/TW_WP_19.pdf (discussing the “basic 
differences in the US and EU approach to data privacy regulation.”).  
42  Schwartz, supra note 39, at 1979 (discussing the U.S. sectoral approach to 
data privacy restrictions). 
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protected data.  The EU protects information that is identifiable to 
a person, whereas the U.S. protects information that is actually 
linked to an identified person. 43   The EU approach is over 
inclusive, whereas the U.S. approach is under inclusive, given that 
whether information can be re-identified depends upon technology 
and corporate practices that permit the linking of de-identified 
data with already identified data. 44   Fifth, the scope of the 
protection differs, as generally under EU law, as well as under the 
law of the Council of Europe, data concerning activities even of a 
professional nature are protected. 45   Finally, the powers of the 
enforcing authorities differ.  Member states have established 
independent authorities to implement the Directive in the EU that 
monitor and enforce the data privacy laws, thereby contributing to 
its consistent application throughout the Union.46  In the U.S., the 
Federal Trade Commission shares some of the powers used by its 
counterpart authorities in Europe to combat unfair or deceptive 
acts or practices affecting commerce.47   There are, nevertheless, 
limits on the scope of its activities.  The Federal Trade Commission 
does not have jurisdiction over all companies, 48  and its 
                                                     
43  Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, Reconciling Personal Information in the 
United States and European Union, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 877, 880 (2014) (explaining the 
difference between the U.S. and EU systems in its treatment of data “in situations 
where the data is merely identifiable but the people to whom the data pertains are 
not currently identified”).  Under EU law, an identifiable individual is an 
individual which, “while not identified, is described in this information in a way 
which makes it possible to find out who the data subject is by conducting further 
research.”  EUR. UNION AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RTS. & COUNCIL OF EUR., 
HANDBOOK ON EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION LAW 39 (2013). 
44  Schwartz & Solove, supra note 43, at 893–94 (discussing the concerns about 
computerized, automated decision making).  
45  See Joined Cases C-92/09 and C-93/09, Volker and Markus Schecke GbR & 
Hartmut Eifert v. Land Hessen, 2010 E.C.R. 662, ¶ 59 (“The European Court of 
Human Rights has held on this point, with reference to the interpretation of 
Article 8 of the Convention, that the term ‘private life’ must not be interpreted 
restrictively . . . .“).  
46  Data Protection Directive, supra note 2, art. 28 (requiring each Member 
State to create a supervisory authority and laying out the responsibilities of this 
supervisory authority). 
47  The Department of Transportation has similar authority over air carriers. 
49 U.S.C. § 41712 (1994) (granting authority to the Secretary of Transportation to 
investigate “unfair or deceptive practice or an unfair method of competition”). 
48  Exempt from the FTC’s jurisdiction are many types of financial 
institutions, airlines, telecommunications carriers and other types of entities.  15 
U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (1952) (creating exemptions for “banks, savings and loan 
institutions . . . federal credit unions . . . common carriers . . . air carriers and 
foreign air carriers . . . .”). 
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enforcement has not extended to the narrow range of Fair 
Information Practices used in the United States. 
The standards of transferring data set by the 1995 EU Data 
Protection directive presuppose that the Commission determines 
that a non-EU country ensures an “adequate level of protection.”49  
The EU privacy regime has succeeded through these “adequacy 
decisions” in leveling up the protection of privacy in the U.S.50  The 
Department of Commerce of the U.S. issued the Safe Harbor 
Principles, recognized by the European Commission. 51   The 
                                                     
49  Articles 25 and 26 of the Data Protection Directive of October 24, 1995 lay 
out the legal framework for transfers of personal data from the EU to third 
countries outside the EEA.  Both the law of the Council of Europe and the 
European Union law foresee contractual clauses between the data exporting 
controller and the recipient in the third country as a possible means of 
safeguarding a sufficient level of data protection at the recipient.  The European 
Commission has developed standard contractual clauses officially certified as 
proof of adequate data protection.  Controllers can formulate ad hoc contractual 
clauses.  Protection can also be guaranteed by binding corporate rules, usually 
multilateral, which may involve several European data protection authorities at 
the same time.  See Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Working Document 
Setting Up a Framework for the Structure of Binding Corporate Rules, WP 154 (June 24, 
2008) (establishing a framework to provide guidance to organizations developing 
BCRs regarding international transfers of personal data); Article 29 Data 
Protection Working Party, Working Document Setting Up a Table with the Elements 
and Principles to Be Found in Binding Corporate Rules, WP 153 (June 24, 2008) (laying 
out the criteria for approval of BCRs). 
50  According to Article 26(1) of the Data Protection Directive, which contains 
provisions similar to those of the Additional Protocol to Convention 108, interests 
of the data subject may justify the free flow of data to a third country if the data 
subject has given unambiguous consent to the export of the data, the data subject 
enters or prepares to enter into a contractual relationship which clearly requires 
that the data be transferred to a recipient abroad, or transfer is necessary in order 
to protect the vital interest of the data subject, in case the data exists in public 
registers, the legitimate interests of others may justify free trans-border flow of 
data.  This is also justified by an important public interest, apart from matters of 
national or public security, as they are not covered by the Data Protection 
Directive, or to establish, exercise or defend legal claims. Data Protection 
Directive, supra note 2, art. 26(1) (providing that a transfer of personal data to a 
third country may take place with other conditions).  
51  The Safe Harbor decision was determined following an opinion of Article 
29 Working Party and an opinion of the Article 31 Committee delivered by a 
qualified majority of Member States.  In accordance with Council Decision 
1999/468, 1999, O.J. (L 184) 23 (EC), the Safe Harbor decision was subject to prior 
scrutiny by the European Parliament.  Commission Decision 2000/520/EC, of 26 
July 2000 Pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the Adequacy of the Protection Provided by the Safe Harbor Privacy 
Principles and Related Frequently Asked Questions Issued by the U.S. 
Department of Commerce, 2000 O.J. (L 215) 7 [hereinafter Safe Harbor Decision] 
(implementing the Safe Harbor Privacy Principles). 
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principles institute a system of self-certification of the companies, 
which have signed up for it by notifying the U.S. Department of 
Commerce while the U.S. Federal Trade Commission enforces the 
agreement.52  Signing up for the arrangements is voluntary and 
resubmitted on an annual basis. 53   Financial services and 
telecommunication industries are outside the Federal Trade 
Commission enforcement powers and thus are excluded from the 
Safe Harbor, 54  whereas many industry and services sectors are 
present among certified companies including Internet companies 
and industries ranging from information and computer services to 
pharmaceuticals, travel and tourism services, healthcare and credit 
card services, which provide services in the EU internal market.55 
The Safe Harbor Principles are intended for use by U.S. 
organizations receiving personal data from the EU for the purpose 
of meeting the presumption of “adequacy” foreseen in the EU 
regulations.  Decisions by organizations to qualify for the safe 
harbor are voluntary, but once it complies with the principles, 
which rely in whole or in part on self-regulation, the failure to 
comply must be actionable.56  According to the principles of the 
safe harbor agreement, an organization must inform individuals 
                                                     
52  The Department of Commerce reviews Safe Harbor self-certifications and 
annual recertification submissions that it receives from companies to ensure that 
they include all the elements required and updates a list of companies that have 
filed self-certification letters.  The FTC intervenes against unfair or deceptive 
practices, within its powers of consumer protection according to Section 5 of the 
Federal Trade Commission Act.  The FTC is committed to review, on a priority 
basis, all referrals from EU Member State authorities.  Federal Trade Commission 
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 5 (1914) [hereinafter Federal Trade Commission Act] (detailing 
prohibition of “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce”).   
53  Companies must also identify in their publicly available privacy policy 
that they adhere to the Principles and comply with them.  By late September 2013, 
the Safe Harbor agreement had a membership of 3,246 companies.  See European 
Commission Memo, supra note 13, at 2 (answering questions regarding “actions to 
be taken to restore trust in data flows between the EU and the U.S.”).  
54  Federal Trade Commission Act, supra note 52, § 5 (detailing prohibition of 
“unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce”).   
55  See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council, on the Functioning of the Safe Harbour from the Perspective of EU Citizens and 
Companies Established in the EU, at 5, COM (2013) 847 final (Nov. 27, 2013) 
[hereinafter Communication on the Functioning of the Safe Harbour], available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/files/com_2013_847_en.pdf (“51% 
are firms that process data of employees in Europe transferred to the US for 
human resource purposes.”).   
56  Federal Trade Commission Act, supra note 52, § 5 (prohibiting unfair and 
deceptive acts or another law or regulation prohibiting such acts). 
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about the purposes for which it collects and uses information about 
them.57  An organization must offer individuals the opportunity to 
choose whether their personal information is to be disclosed to a 
third party or to be used for a purpose that is incompatible with 
the purposes for which it was originally collected or subsequently 
authorized. 58   Where an organization wishes to transfer 
information to a third party that is acting as an agent, it may do so 
if it first ascertains that the third party subscribes to the Principles 
or is subject to the Directive or another adequacy finding, or enters 
in agreement with third parties requiring that they provide at least 
the same level of privacy protection.59   Organizations creating, 
maintaining, using or disseminating personal information must 
take reasonable precautions to protect it from loss, misuse and 
unauthorized access, disclosure alteration and destruction.  
Information must be relevant for the purposes for which it is used 
and individuals must have access at each moment and the possibility 
to correct it. 60   And effective privacy protection must include 
mechanisms for assuring compliance with the Principles, as well as 
recourse for individuals to whom the data relate affected by non-
compliance with the principles. 61   The Safe Harbor agreement 
follows the EU definition of personal data saying that it concerns 
“data about an identified or identifiable individual that are within 
the scope of the Directive, received by a U.S. organization from the 
European Union, and recorded in any form.”62 
Following the Commission’s alert to the Department of 
                                                     
57  Such organizations must also inform individuals about how to contact the 
organization with any inquiries or complaints, the types of third parties to which 
it discloses the information, and the choices and means the organization offers 
individuals for limiting its use and disclosure.  See Safe Harbor Privacy Principles, 
supra note 5.  
58  In case of sensitive personal information specifying medical or health 
conditions, racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical 
beliefs, trade union membership or information specifying the sex life of the 
individual, individuals must be given affirmative or explicit choice if the 
information is to be disclosed to a third party or used for a purpose other than 
those for which it was originally collected or subsequently authorized by the 
individual through the exercise of opt in choice.  See id.  
59  Id. 
60  Id. 
61  Id.  
62  See Safe Harbor Decision, supra note 51, at Annex I (delineating the Safe 
Harbor Privacy Principles and detailing the requirement that transfers of personal 
data take place only to non-EU countries that provide an “adequate” level of 
privacy protection). 
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Commerce, the latter made it mandatory since March 2013 for a 
Safe Harbor company to make their privacy policy for 
customer/user data readily available on their public website.63  For 
the Commission, the Department of Commerce must actively 
follow up on the effective incorporation of the Safe Harbor 
principles in companies’ privacy policies rather than leave 
enforcement action to the initiative of individuals’ complaints.64  In 
this respect, apart from the FTC’s enforcing authority within its 
powers against unfair or deceptive acts or practices in affecting 
commerce, the Commission proposes that organizations must 
commit to cooperating with the EU Data Protection Panel. 65  
Further, Article 29 Working Party found insufficiencies in the 
                                                     
63  Communication on the Functioning of the Safe Harbour, supra note 55, at 7 
(discussing the requirement of transparency of companies’ privacy policies under 
the Safe Harbor).  They are also required to identify on their website an 
Alternative Dispute Resolution provider and to include a link to the Safe Harbor 
self-certification on the website of the Department of Commerce.  Id. at 8.  
According to estimates, over thirty percent of the Safe Harbor members do not 
provide dispute resolution information in the privacy policies on their websites, 
citing Chris Connolly’s (Galexia) appearance before the European Parliament 
LIBE Committee inquiry on 7 Oct. 2013.  Id. at 7.  According to the European 
Commission, up to ten percent of the certified companies have not fully complied 
with the requirement to post a privacy policy containing the Safe Harbor 
statement on their websites, while another ten percent post false claims of safe 
Harbor adherence.  Id.  About ten percent of companies claiming membership in 
the Safe Harbor are not listed by the Department of Commerce as current 
members of the scheme, which is due either to failure to resubmit their 
certification annually or to not having self-certified in the first place.  Id.  The 
Commission has also found that many privacy policies of self-certified companies 
are unclear as regards the purposes for which data are collected, and the right to 
choose whether or not it will be disclosed to third parties, raising issues of 
compliance with the principles of “Notice” and “Choice.”  Id. at 9.  In parallel, the 
Department of Commerce does not maintain an updated list of the companies 
who are indeed adhering to the Safe Harbor Privacy Principles.  Id. 
64  Id. at 9 (noting that the incorporation of the Safe Harbor Privacy Principles 
is not “sufficiently ensured”). 
65  This is a body competent for investigating and resolving complaints 
lodged by individuals for alleged infringement of the Safe Harbor Privacy 
Principles by a U.S. company member.  Companies that self-certify must choose to 
comply with independent recourse mechanism or to cooperate with the EU Data 
Protection Panel in order to remedy problems arising out of failure to comply 
with Safe Harbor Privacy Principles.  Cooperation with the EU Data Protection 
Panel is mandatory when the U.S. company processes human resources personal 
data transferred from the EU in the context of an employment relationship.  If the 
company commits itself to cooperate with the EU panel, it must also commit itself 
to comply with any advice given by the EU where it takes the view that the 
company needs to take specific action to comply with the Safe Harbor Privacy 
Principles including remedial or compensatory measures.  
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absence of a public body which would enforce the Safe Harbor 
principles, as the FTC has only limited powers which do not 
include sectors such as financial services (banks and insurance), 
telecommunications, transportation, employment relationships and 
non-profit activities.66  
Under the Safe Harbor Agreement, the EU national Data 
Protection Authorities have the right to suspend data transfers to 
Safe Harbor certified companies in specific cases.67  Independent 
from the powers they have under the Safe Harbor decision, EU 
national Data Protection Authorities also have powers distinct 
from those provided by the Safe Harbor Agreement that permit 
intervention in data transfers in order to assure compliance with 
the general principles of data protection set forth in the 1995 Data 
Protection Directive.  These include the ability to intervene in the 
case of international transfers.68  If a company has not joined the 
Safe Harbor Privacy Principles, then in case of data flow from a 
company situated in a member state of the European Union in a 
                                                     
66  Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 4/2000 on the Level of 
Protection Provided by the “Safe Harbor Principles” 1, 3, WP 32 (May 16, 2000), 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-
29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2000/wp32_en.pdf (noting 
that safe harbor benefits only apply to organizations that are subject to FTC-type 
jurisdiction).  Enforcement of the principles would rely either on Alternative 
Dispute Resolution or on the injunctive powers of the Federal Trade Commission 
which were not found to be satisfactory either as the bridge between the two 
layers is uncertain: the ADR bodies should notify to the FTC cases of failure to 
comply, but there is no obligation for them to do so.  Id. at 7.  The powers of the 
FTC are discretionary, which means that although the individuals concerned can 
file a complaint, there is no guarantee that the FTC will examine their case, and 
individuals do not have a right to be heard before the FTC, neither to enforce the 
ADR bodies’ decisions nor to challenge them or the lack thereof.  This means that 
individuals concerned by an alleged violation of the principles would not be 
assured of the right to stand before an independent instance.  Id. at 7. 
67  “ [S]uspension of transfers can be required in two situations, where: (a) the 
government body in the U.S. has determined that the company is violating the 
Safe Harbor Privacy Principles; or (b) there is a substantial likelihood that the Safe 
Harbor Privacy Principles are being violated; there is a reasonable basis for 
believing that the enforcement mechanism concerned is not taking or will not take 
adequate and timely steps to settle the case at issue; the continuing transfer would 
create an imminent risk of grave harm to data subjects; and the competent 
authorities in the Member State have made reasonable efforts under the 
circumstances to provide the company with notice and an opportunity to 
respond.”  Communication on the Functioning of the Safe Harbour, supra note 55, at 4 
n.12.  
68  Id. at 4 (noting that EU national data protection authorities are competent 
to intervene, even in the case of international transfers, to ensure compliance).  
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parent company in the United States, the exporter based in the EU 
must go through the proceedings laid down in the EU Member 
state where the company is situated.69  The European Commission 
can adapt the decision, suspend it, or limit its scope at any time in 
light of its implementation,70 especially if there is a systemic failure 
on the U.S. side, if a body responsible for ensuring compliance 
with the Safe Harbor Privacy Principles in the United States is not 
fulfilling its role, or if the level of protection provided by the Safe 
Harbor is overtaken by the requirements of U.S. legislation. 71 
Following the revelations on U.S. surveillance programs, German 
Data Protection Authority (“DPA”) went further, expressing 
concerns that there may be violations of the principles in the 
                                                     
69  Id. at 5. 
70  See Regulation 182/2011, 2011 O.J. (L 55) 13 (setting out the examination 
procedure).  
71  Gaps in transparency or in enforcement on the U.S. side due to the 
voluntary adherence of these companies, result in responsibility being shifted to 
European Data Protection authorities and to the companies, which use the 
scheme.  See, e.g., Düsseldorfer Kreis decision of 28/29 (Apr. 2010) and Beschluss 
der obersten Aufsichtsbehörden für den Datenschutz im nicht-öffentlichen 
Bereich am 28/29 (Apr. 2010), available at 
http://www.bfdi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Publikationen/Entschliessungssammlun
g/DuesseldorferKreis/290410_SafeHarbor.pdf?__blob=publicationFile 
(expounding on decisions by German data protection authorities requesting 
companies transferring data from Europe to the U.S. to actively check that 
companies in the U.S. importing data comply with Safe Harbor Privacy Principles 
and recommending that at least the exporting company must determine whether 
the Safe Harbor Certification by the importer is still valid). 
 However, the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), Peter Hustinx 
expressed an opinion at the European Parliament LIEBE Committee Inquiry on 
October 7, 2013 that “substantial improvements have been made and most issues 
now been settled” as far as Safe Harbor is concerned.  Peter Hustinx, LIBE 
Committee Inquiry on Electronic Mass Surveillance of EU Citizens (Oct. 7, 2013), 
available at 
https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Docum
ents/EDPS/Publications/Speeches/2013/13-10-07_Speech_LIBE_PH_EN.pdf.  
Past similar cases include the French CNIL finding in 2012 that Google provides 
insufficient information to its users on its personal data processing operations.  
Press Release, CNIL, Google’s New Privacy Policy: Incomplete Information and 
Uncontrolled Combination of Data Across Services, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/article29/documentation/otherdocument/files/2012/20121016_press
_release_google_privacy_cnil_en.pdf (stating that “Google does not provide user 
control over the combination of data across its numerous services” and “Google 
does not provide retention periods”).  
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Commission’s decisions and requested that companies transferring 
personal data to U.S. providers inform the DPA on whether and 
how the concerned providers can prevent access by the NSA.72 
      All companies involved in the PRISM program that grant access 
to U.S. authorities to data stored and processed in the U.S. are Safe 
Harbor certified.  The national security exception means that 
information obtained in violation of the Safe Harbor Agreement 
and transferred to the State authorities that conduct surveillance is 
not protected and the individual has no right whatsoever to it.  
Under the existing agreements, the Safe Harbor is not protective 
enough.  The current Safe Harbor Agreement cannot survive under 
the new regulation proposed by the Commission, which is 
currently under deliberation.73  If, under the new regulation (once 
it is enacted), the Safe Harbor provisions are amended to be 
compatible with the regulation, then there is a possibility that 
protection may be more efficient.  The EU Regulation raises the 
standards of protection to a point, which must either force the 
renegotiation of the Safe Harbor and other agreements or is bound 
to be unenforceable. 74   Moreover, the Safe Harbor focuses 
essentially on notice and choice of the data and contains very few 
provisions prohibiting the acquisition and retention of data 
                                                     
72   See Conference of Data Protection Commissioners Says that Intelligence Services 
Constitute a Massive Threat to Data Traffic Between Germany and Countries Outside 
Europe, DIE BUNDESBEAUFTRAGTE FÜR DEN DATENSCHUTZ UND DIE 
INFORMATIONSFREIHEIT (July 24, 2003), 
http://www.bfdi.bund.de/EN/Home/homepage_Kurzmeldungen/PMDSK_Saf
eHarbor.html?nn=408870 (discussing a resolution of a German Conference of data 
protection commissioners with regard to Internet traffic between companies in 
Germany and countries outside of Europe).  The Irish and Luxembourg DPAs 
have not found an absence of compliance in complaints that reference the Safe 
Harbor agreement or violation of their national data protection laws.  See David 
Meyer, Privacy Campaigners Lose Luxembourg Bid to Censure Microsoft  over NSA 
Links (Nov. 18, 2013, 4:36 AM), available at 
https://gigaom.com/2013/11/18/privacy-campaigners-lose-luxembourg-bid-to-
censure-microsoft-over-nsa-links/ (discussing a statement from the National 
Commission for Data Protection finding that Microsoft’s data transfer from 
Europe to the U.S. did not break EU privacy law).  The Irish High Court has 
granted an application for judicial review on the inaction of the Irish Data 
Protection Commissioner following a complaint by a student group. See 
Communication on the Functioning of the Safe Harbour, supra note 55 (discussing that 
the Irish DPA declined to investigate two complaints referencing the Safe Harbor 
program, one of which was filed by a student group, Europe v. Facebook (EvF), 
who had also filed other complaints).  
73  See infra Part 3.1. 
74  See infra Part 3.1. 
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altogether, which is imposed under the new regulation.75     
The European Commission is trying, through interpretation, to 
limit the scope of the national security exception in the 
transatlantic flow of data,76 pointing out that this exception as a 
limitation of a fundamental right must be narrowly construed, set 
forth in a publicly accessible law and necessary and proportionate 
in a democratic society.77  Under current U.S. legislation, “there are 
no opportunities for either EU or US data subjects to obtain access, 
rectification or erasure of data, or administrative or judicial redress 
with regard to collection and further processing of their personal 
data taking place under the US surveillance programmes.” 78  
Further, companies do not systematically indicate in their privacy 
policies when they apply exceptions to the principles.  Individuals 
and companies are not aware of what is being done with their data.  
The Commission also recommends that the privacy policies of self-
certified companies should include information on the extent to 
which U.S. law allows public authorities to collect and process data 
transferred under the Safe Harbor.79 
                                                     
75  See infra Part 3.1. 
76  See Safe Harbor Privacy Principles, supra note 5 (existing also in the Safe 
Harbor Privacy Principles as well as Directive 95/46/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995, mentioned throughout the 
paper, as well as the proposal for Regulation of the European Parliament and of 
the Council).  
77 See Communication on the Functioning of the Safe Harbour, supra note 55, at 19.  
 The wording of the national security exceptions is that limitations are allowed 
only “to the extent necessary” to meet national security, public interest, or law 
enforcement requirements.”  Safe Harbor Decision, supra note 51, at annex I.  The 
Commission also requires to be notified by the Department of any statute or 
government regulations that would affect adherence to the Safe Harbor Privacy 
Principles, while it stresses that the use of exceptions should be carefully 
monitored and the exceptions must not be used in a way that undermines the 
protection afforded by the Principles.  See Article 29 Data Protection Working 
Party, Opinion 4/2000 on the Level of Protection Provided by the “Safe Harbor 
Principles,” EUR. COMM’N, WP 32 (May 16, 2000) [hereinafter Article 29 Working 
Party Opinion 4/2000]; see also Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council: Rebuilding Trust in EU-US Data Flows, at 11, COM (2013) 
846 final (Nov. 27, 2013) [hereinafter Rebuilding Trust], available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/files/com_2013_846_en.pdf.  
78  Communication on the Functioning of the Safe Harbour, supra note 55, § 7.2, at 
17. 
79  This means that companies should be encouraged to indicate in their 
privacy policies when they apply exceptions to the Principles to meet national 
security, public interest or law enforcement requirements and stresses that the 
exception must be used only to an extent that is strictly necessary or 
proportionate.  The Commission’s concern, however, is limited to imposing a 
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2. DATA COLLECTION AND THE U.S. AUTHORITIES UNDER THE U.S. 
PATRIOT ACT 
 
2.1. Surveillance Within the U.S. 
 
According to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, any 
government agency seeking to use electronic surveillance for 
foreign intelligence purposes inside the United States must obtain 
a warrant 80 from a special court, the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court. 81   The warrant may be issued upon 
government proof of “probable cause to believe that the target of 
the electronic surveillance” is an agent of a foreign power.82  FISA 
imposes “minimization” procedures to protect the privacy rights of 
individuals who are not “targets” of FISA surveillance, but whose 
conversations or personal information are incidentally picked up in 
the course of electronic surveillance of legitimate targets under the 
                                                     
duty to the private actors who are collecting data that they may be obligated to 
disclose to certain authorities or other third parties.  “For example, Nokia, which 
has operations in the U.S. and is a Safe Harbor member[,] provides [the] following 
notice in its privacy policy: ’We may be obligated by mandatory law to disclose 
your personal data to certain authorities or other third parties, for example, to law 
enforcement agencies in the countries where we or third parties acting on our 
behalf operate.’”  European Commission Memo, supra note 13, at 5.  
80  50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1863 (1978). 
81  Established by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) consisted initially of seven, and 
now eleven, federal judges appointed by the Chief Justice of the United States to 
serve staggered terms on the FISC.  Id. § 1822. 
82  Id. § 1805.  FISA requires the Attorney General to approve all applications 
for FISA warrants, to report to the House and Senate Intelligence Committees 
every six months on the FISA process and the results of FISA-authorized 
surveillance, and to make an annual report to Congress and the public about the 
total number of applications made for FISA warrants and the total number of 
applications granted, modified, or denied.  Id. § 1802.  It expressly provides that 
no United States citizen or legal resident of the United States may be targeted for 
surveillance under FISA “solely upon the basis of activities protected by the first 
amendment to the Constitution of the United States.”  Id. § 1805.  FISA requires 
the use of “minimization” procedures to protect the privacy rights of individuals 
who are not “targets” of FISA surveillance but whose conversations or personal 
information are incidentally picked up in the course of electronic surveillance of 
legitimate targets under the Act.  Id. 
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Act.83  Congress progressively extended the application of the FISA 
to pen register and trap-and-trace orders,84 and to limited forms of 
business records, including documents kept by common carriers, 
public accommodation facilities, storage facilities, and vehicle 
rental facilities.85 
The USA Patriot Act of 2001 empowered the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court to order the release of “any tangible 
thing,” including historical and transactional information relating 
to telephone calls and emails, financial information and consumer 
credit information, to the FBI.86  The first requirement is that this 
information is relevant to “an investigation to obtain foreign 
intelligence information not concerning a United States person or 
to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence 
activities, provided that such investigation of a United States 
person is not conducted solely upon the basis of activities 
protected by the first amendment to the Constitution.”87  The term 
“tangible things” may refer to any objects, or databases, library 
records and Internet browsing histories.88  Phone records are to be 
collected containing subscriber information, toll billing records 
information or electronic communication transactional records,89 as 
well as financial records.  The second requirement is a statement of 
fact by the FBI proving that “there are reasonable grounds to 
believe that the tangible things sought are relevant to an 
authorized investigation”90 under the Act.91 
                                                     
83  Minimization procedures govern the implementation of electronic 
surveillance to ensure that such implementation conforms to its authorized 
purpose.  Id. § 1801.  The procedures are adopted by the Attorney General and 
reviewed by the FISA Court.  Id. 
84  This enables the government to obtain lists of the telephone numbers and 
e-mails contacted by an individual after the issuance of the order.   50 U.S.C. § 1842 
(2008) (allowing access to pen registers and trap and trace devices for foreign 
intelligence and international terrorism investigations). 
85  50 U.S.C. § 1862(a) (2001) (allowing access to certain business records).  
86  USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 215, 115 Stat. 272 (codified as 50 
U.S.C. § 1861(a)(1)(2012)). 
87  Id.  
88  Levinson-Waldman, supra note 31, at 8. 
89  18 U.S.C. § 2709 (a). 
90  USA PATRIOT Act, supra note 86, at 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(a). 
91  See id. § 1861 (c)(2)(D).  To obtain a section 215 order, the U.S. Government 
must show that the item sought must be able to be “obtained with a subpoena 
duces tecum issued by a court of the United States in aid of a grand jury 
investigation or with any other order issued by a court of the United States 
directing the production of records or tangible things.”  Id.; see also ACLU v. 
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The Act authorizes the issuance of National Security Letters, a 
form of administrative subpoenas by which the FBI can obtain 
access to this material. 92   They are primarily used to obtain 
telephone toll records, e-mail subscriber information, and banking 
and credit card records.93  Access to these records is allowed even if 
the subject is not a suspect in the investigation:  under the Patriot 
Act, the FBI can issue an NSL when an authorized FBI official 
certifies that the records sought are “relevant to an authorized 
investigation.”94  The legality of these orders may be challenged by 
filing a petition within a year of their issuance. 95   Financial 
institutions are obliged to comply with a request for a customer’s 
financial records when the authorities testify that the records are 
sought for foreign counterintelligence purposes. 96   Statutes 
authorizing National Security Letters include the Right to Financial 
Privacy Act,97 the Fair Credit Reporting Act,98 and the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act.99  For issuance of these letters, the 
requirement is “information or allegation” indicating that a threat 
to national security may occur, but not an “articulable factual 
basis” required by full FBI investigations.100   This information can 
be kept for thirty years after the investigation’s closure.101  The 
                                                     
Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 743 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“Read in harmony, the Stored 
Communications Act does not limit the Government’s ability to obtain 
information from communications providers under section 215 because section 
215 orders are functionally equivalent to grand jury subpoenas.”).   
92  18 U.S.C. § 2709 (a).  
93  Id.; 12 USC § 3414 (allowing the FBI to gain access to records in financial 
institutions for purposes of foreign counterintelligence).  Although initially used 
sparingly, in 2012 “the FBI issued 21,000 NSLs . . . primarily for subscriber 
information.”  LIBERTY AND SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD: REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GROUP ON INTELLIGENCE AND 
COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES 90 (Dec. 12, 2013) [hereinafter LIBERTY REPORT], 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2013-12-
12_rg_final_report.pdf.  
94  18 U.S.C. § 2709(b)(1). 
95  USA PATRIOT Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (f)(2)(A)(i). 
96  12 U.S.C. § 3414(a)(5)(A). 
97  12 U.S.C. § 3401. 
98  15 U.S.C. § 1681. 
99  18 U.S.C. § 2709.  
100  John Ashcroft, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, The Attorney General’s Guidelines on 
General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise and Terrorism Enterprise Investigations 
21–22, § VI.A., B. (2002) [hereinafter Ashcroft Guidelines]. 
101  OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF THE FBI’S 
USE OF NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS: ASSESSMENT OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS AND 
EXAMINATION OF NSL USAGE IN 2006, 68 n.41 (Mar. 2008) [hereinafter 2008 OIG 
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statute allowing disclosure of a full credit report contains no 
limitations on dissemination.  The financial and communications 
NSL statutes refer to the Attorney General Guidelines, which allow 
sharing with law enforcement agencies, the intelligence 
Community and foreign governments.102  NSL derived information 
is uploaded into the Investigative Data Warehouse, and is likely to 
be available to the National Counterterrorism Center.   
The Supreme Court has held that the “Fourth Amendment was 
not intended to interfere with the power of the courts to compel, 
through a subpoena the production” of evidence as long as the 
order compelling the production of records or other tangible 
objects meets the general test of “reasonableness.”103  Section 215 of 
the U.S. Patriot Act extends the principle of subpoena from the 
criminal investigation into the realm of foreign intelligence.  
Section 215 is based upon Supreme Court decisions, which held 
that individuals have no “reasonable expectation of privacy” in 
information they voluntarily share with third parties such as banks 
and telephone companies.104  The philosophy behind this ruling is 
that what a person knowingly exposes to third parties is not a 
subject of Fourth Amendment protection.105  The Court applied this 
reasoning to bank records 106  and to an individual’s telephone 
calling records.107  The Financial Privacy Act generally prohibited 
financial institutions from recording personal financial records and 
                                                     
REPORT], available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/s0803b/final.pdf (“The 
length of time that the FBI retains investigative information . . . depends on 
several factors . . . .  In general, information related to intelligence investigations is 
retained in the FBI’s files . . . for 30 years after a case is closed, and information 
related to criminal investigations is retained for 20 years after a case is closed.”). 
102  12 U.S.C. § 3414(a)(5)(B) (2013) (“The Federal Bureau of Investigation may 
disseminate information obtained pursuant to this paragraph only as provided in 
guidelines approved by the Attorney General for foreign intelligence collection 
and foreign counter-intelligence investigations . . . . “); 18 U.S.C. § 2709(d) (2013) 
(“The Federal Bureau of Investigation may disseminate information and records 
obtained under this section only as provided in guidelines approved by the 
Attorney General . . . . “); MICHAEL B. MUKASEY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE 
ATTORNEY GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR DOMESTIC FBI OPERATIONS 37, 41, § II (2008) 
[hereinafter MUKASEY GUIDELINES], available at 
http://www.justice.gov/ag/readingroom/guidelines.pdf (providing guidelines 
for domestic FBI investigations). 
103  Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906).  
104  Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).  
105  I am grateful to David Cole for this interpretation.  
106  Miller v. United States, 425 U.S. 435, 440–41 (1976).  
107  Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979).  
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it expressly authorized them to disclose such records in response to 
lawful subpoenas and search warrants.108 
 The idea of separate spheres of privacy 109  that are not 
necessarily overlapping and are under the control of the individual 
is missing in U.S. law.  According to this idea, if an individual 
consents to the use of some of her data by a private company, 
bank, credit card company, Internet service provider, telephone 
company, health-care provider, etc., this does not necessarily mean 
that she consents to further use of this data by other actors.  The 
individual must retain the right to define and redefine at every 
moment who has access to what kind of information that concerns 
her. 
In 2012, the Supreme Court held that long-term surveillance of 
an individual’s location, effected by attaching a GPS device to his 
car, constituted a trespass and therefore, a “search” within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.110  Five Justices suggested that 
the surveillance might have infringed on the driver’s “reasonable 
expectation of privacy,” even if there had been no technical 
trespass and even though an individual’s movements in public are 
voluntarily exposed to third parties. 111   A recent FISC opinion 
recognized that the “Supreme Court may someday revisit the 
third-party disclosure principle in the context of twenty-first 
century communications technology, but that day has not arrived.  
Accordingly, Smith remains controlling with respect to the 
acquisition by the government from service providers of non-
content telephony metadata . . . .”112  In another opinion of the 
                                                     
108  Right to Financial Privacy Act, § 1114, Pub. L. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3707 
(codified at 12 U.S.C. 3414) (1978). 
109  For a general analysis, see FERDINAND DAVID SCHOEMAN, PRIVACY AND 
SOCIAL FREEDOM (1992) (discussing the assumption in moral philosophy that 
social control is an intellectually and morally destructive source). 
110  United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949–51 (2012). 
111  Justice Sonia Sotomayor observed in her concurring opinion that  
it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to 
third parties . . . .  This approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which 
people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third 
parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks . . . .  I would not 
assume that all information voluntarily disclosed to [others] for a limited 
purpose is, for that reason alone, disentitled to Fourth Amendment 
protection.  
Id. at 957 (Sotomayor, J. concurring) (citations omitted). 
112  In re Application of the Fed. Bureau of Investigation for an Order 
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same Court, the Court determined that the bulk telephony 
metadata program meets “the low statutory hurdle set out in 
Section 215.”113 
The phone metadata collected pursuant to Section 215 of the 
Patriot Act is retained for five years, unless it is responsive to 
authorized queries, and is thus retained pursuant to the 
procedures of the agency holding the information, e.g. the NSA or 
another agency such as the FBI with whom the NSA shared the 
data.114  Similarly concerning onward transfers and sharing of data 
collected under Section 215, the orders for the production or 
telephony metadata among other requirements, prohibit the 
sharing of the raw data and permit the NSA to share with other 
agencies only data that are responsive to authorized queries for 
counterterrorism.115 
 The FISC has imposed limitations on the use of this metadata. 
The current program acquires a large amount of telephony 
metadata each day, which represents only a small percentage of 
the total telephony metadata held by service providers.116   The 
FISC orders defining the use of this data prohibited the 
government from accessing the metadata for any purpose other 
than to obtain foreign intelligence information.117  The FISA court 
                                                     
Requiring the Production of Tangible Things from [Redacted version], Docket No. 
BR 13-158 (FISC Oct. 11, 2013), pp. 5–6. 
113  In re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order 
Requiring the Production of Tangible Things from [Redacted version], Docket No. 
BR 13-109 (FISC Aug. 29, 2013), p. 22.  
114  MUKASEY GUIDELINES, supra note 102.  The guidelines provide that any 
information obtained will be kept in accordance with a records retention plan 
approved by the National Archives and Records Administration.  The latter does 
not establish specific retention periods, providing instead that records should be 
deleted or destroyed when the agency determines they are no longer needed for 
administrative, legal, audit or other operational purposes.  Id. 
115  Id. at 8. The Attorney General’s guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations 
also provide that the FBI may disseminate collected personal information to other 
U.S. intelligence agencies as well as to law enforcement authorities of the 
executive branch for a number of reasons or on the basis of other statutes and 
legal authorities.  
116  A similar metadata program for Internet communications under the 
authority of FISA’s pen register and trap-and-trace provisions (rather than the 
authority of section 215) was suspended, for operational and technical reasons, 
and because the program was insufficiently productive to justify the cost. See 
LIBERTY REPORT, supra note 93, at 97. 
117  Access to this data is allowed only when there are facts giving rise to a 
“reasonable, articulable suspicion” that the selection term to be queried “is 
associated with a specific foreign terrorist organization,” a finding which is made 
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does not review or approve individual queries either in advance or 
after the fact.  It sets only the criteria for queries and receives 
reports every thirty days from the NSA concerning the number of 
identifiers used to query the metadata and the results of these 
queries.118  While the FISC requires that the “reasonable, articulable 
suspicion” requirement be met, the NSA does not have to go back 
to the Court to justify particular queries, deciding itself whether 
this requirement is met. 119   While the administration has 
emphasized that only 300 identifiers were used to query the data 
during 2012, the NSA has acknowledged that it can obtain 
additional phone numbers that are up to three “hops” out from the 
original number.120  These hops refer to the number of connections 
from the original number:  the first “hop” is to phone numbers the 
original number is in contact with, the second is numbers in 
contact with the first “hop” numbers, and the third is the numbers 
in contact with those “second hop” numbers.121   While the agency 
may not run a three-hop analysis on every contact, a decision to do 
so gives it access to the phone records of millions. 
 
2.2. Surveillance Outside the U.S. 
 
The United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 2008 
adopted different rules for international communications 
depending on whether the target of the surveillance was a “United 
States person” (a category including both American citizens and 
non-citizens who are legal permanent residents of the United 
States)122 or a “non United States person.”123  According to Section 
                                                     
by one of twenty-two specially trained persons.  ADMINISTRATION WHITE PAPER: 
BULK COLLECTION OF TELEPHONY METADATA UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA 
PATRIOT ACT 3 (2013) [hereinafter WHITE PAPER], available at 
http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/750211-administration-white-
paper-section-215.html; see also LIBERTY REPORT, supra note 93, at 98 (discussing 
recommendations of the President’s Review Group on Intelligence and 
Communications Technologies). 
118  Id. at 100. 
119  Levinson-Waldman, supra note 31, at 46. 
120  WHITE PAPER, supra note 117, at 4.  
121  Id. at 3–4. 
122  See 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i).   
’United States person’ means a citizen of the United States, an alien 
lawfully admitted for permanent residence (as defined in section 1101 
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702 of the FISA Amendments Act (“FAA”), if the target of foreign 
intelligence surveillance is a non-United States person who is 
“reasonably believed to be located outside the United States,” the 
Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence may 
authorize surveillance upon the issuance of an order from the FISC 
without showing a probable cause to believe that the target is an 
agent of a foreign power, even if the interception takes place inside 
the U.S.124  Section 702 authorized the FISC to approve annual 
                                                     
(a)(20) of Title 8), an unincorporated association, a substantial number of 
members of which are citizens of the United States or aliens lawfully 
admitted for permanent residence, or a corporation which is 
incorporated in the United States, but does not include a corporation or 
an association which is a foreign power, as defined in subsection (a)(1), 
(2), or (3) of this section.   
50 U.S.C. § 1801(i). 
123  LIBERTY REPORT, supra note 93, at 135.   
[I]f the target of the surveillance is a United States person, the same FISA 
procedures apply—without regard to whether the target is inside or 
outside the United States. . . .  [This means that] surveillance is 
permissible only if it is intended to acquire foreign intelligence 
information and the FISC issues a warrant based on a finding that there 
is probable cause to believe that the United States person is an agent of a 
foreign power, within the meaning of FISA.   
Id. See also 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(a).   
124  Id.  An electronic communication service provider receiving a directive 
from the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence may file a 
petition to modify or set aside such directive with the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court.  50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(4)(A).  Section 1881a mandates that the 
Government obtain the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court’s approval of 
targeting and minimization procedures, and a governmental certification 
regarding proposed surveillance.  50 U.S.C. § 1881a(d); 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(e). 
Among other things, the Government’s certification must attest that (1) 
procedures are in place “that have been approved, have been submitted for 
approval, or will be submitted with the certification for approval by the [FISC] 
that are reasonably designed to ensure that an acquisition . . . is limited to 
targeting persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States;” (2) 
minimization procedures adequately restrict the “acquisition, retention, and 
dissemination of nonpublic information about non-consenting U.S. persons,” as 
appropriate; (3) “guidelines have been adopted . . . to ensure compliance with” 
targeting limits and the Fourth Amendment; and (4) the procedures and 
guidelines referred to above comport with the Fourth Amendment.  50 U.S.C. § 
1881a(g)(2); Legal Standards for the Intelligence Community in Conducting Electronic 
Surveillance, FED. OF AM. SCI. (2000), http://fas.org/irp/nsa/standards.html; 50 
U.S.C. § 1881a(d)(1)(A).  The FISC assesses whether the targeting procedures are 
“reasonably designed” (1) to “ensure that any acquisition . . . is limited to 
targeting persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States;” 
and (2) to “prevent the intentional acquisition of any communication as to which 
the sender and all intended recipients are known . . . to be located in the United 
States.”  50 U.S.C. § 1881a(d)(1)(A); 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(d)(1)(B). 
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certifications submitted by the Attorney General and the Director 
of National Intelligence (“DNI”) that identify certain categories of 
foreign intelligence targets whose communications may then be 
collected, subject to FISC-approved targeting and minimization 
procedures.125  The NSA determines which individuals to target 
pursuant to FISC-approved certifications, but the Government is 
not obliged to “describe to the court each specific target and 
identify each facility at which its surveillance would be directed, 
thus permitting surveillance on a programmatic, not necessarily 
individualized basis.”126  The NSA, on the basis of some identifiers 
(e-mail addresses or telephone numbers) that it reasonably believes 
are being used by non-U.S. persons located outside of the U.S. to 
communicate foreign intelligence information within the scope of 
the approved categories, then acquires the content of telephone 
calls, e-mails, text messages, photographs, and other Internet traffic 
using those identifiers from service providers in the U.S.127   
 
Section 702 requires that NSA’s certifications attest that[:]  
[1] “a ‘significant purpose’ of any acquisition is to obtain 
foreign intelligence information . . . directed at international 
terrorism, nuclear proliferation, or hostile cyber activities[;] 
[2] that [the acquisition] does not intentionally target a 
United States person[;] [3] that it does not intentionally 
target any person known at the time of acquisition to be in 
the United States[;] [4] that it does not target any person 
outside the United States for the purpose of targeting a 
person inside the United States[;] and [5] that it meets the 
requirements of the Fourth Amendment.128 
 
The FISC held in one instance 129  that the minimization 
procedures that applied to NSA’s upstream collection of electronic 
communications did not meet the requirements of FISA or the 
Fourth Amendment, as the NSA’s use of upstream collection often 
                                                     
125  LIBERTY REPORT, supra note 93, at 136. 
126  50 U.S.C.  § 1881a(g); see Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 
1156 (2013) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing Government’s permitting of 
surveillance on a programmatic basis).  
127  LIBERTY REPORT, supra note 93, at 136. 
128  Id. at 136–37. 
129  In re DNI/AG 702(g), Docket Number 702(i)-11-01, at 17, n.15 (FISC Oct. 
3, 2011) [hereinafter FISC Oct. 3, 2011 Opinion]. 
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involves the inadvertent acquisition of multi-communication 
transactions (“MCTs”),130 many of which do not fall within the 
parameters of section 702.  Thus the government’s revelations 
regarding the scope of NSA’s upstream collection implicate 50 
U.S.C. § 1809(a), which makes it a crime to “engage in electronic 
surveillance under color of law except as authorized by statute . . . 
.” 131   For the Court, “[t]he fact that NSA’s technical measures 
cannot prevent NSA from acquiring transactions containing wholly 
domestic communications . . . does not render NSA’s acquisition of 
those transactions ‘unintentional.’” 132   Thus, due to the broad 
method of collection and technical reasons, personal data is 
collected that may not be relevant to foreign intelligence.  
Section 702 affords United States persons the same protection 
against foreign intelligence surveillance when they are outside the 
United States as the FISA affords them when they are inside the 
country’s borders.  A United States person may not lawfully be 
targeted for foreign intelligence surveillance unless the FISC issues 
a warrant based on a finding that there is probable cause to believe 
that the targeted United States person is an agent of a foreign 
power. 133   Section 702 also has an impact on the privacy of 
communications of United States persons due to the risk of 
inadvertent interception.  When incidental acquisition occurs in the 
                                                     
130  MCTs arise when many communications are bundled together within a 
single Internet transmission, resulting in a situation where the lawful interception 
of one communication in the bundle requires in the interception of them all.  
131  FISC Oct. 3, 2011 Opinion, supra note 129.   
NSA’s upstream Internet collection devices are generally incapable of 
distinguishing between transactions containing only a single discrete 
communication to, from, or about a tasked selector and transactions 
containing only a single discrete communication to, from or about a 
tasked selector and transactions containing multiple discrete 
communications, not all of which may be to, from, or about a tasked 
selector. . . .  The sheer volume of transactions acquired by NSA through 
its upstream collection is such that any meaningful review of the entire 
body of the transactions is not feasible.   
Id. at 31 (citations omitted).  What is more,  
Internet service providers are constantly changing their protocols and 
the services they provide, and often give users the ability to customize 
how they use a particular service . . . .  As a result, it is impossible to 
define with any specificity the universe of transactions that will be 
acquired by NSA’s upstream collection at any point in the future.  
Id. at 32 (citations omitted).  
132  Id. at 45.  
133  LIBERTY REPORT, supra note 93, at 146. 
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course of Section 702 surveillance, existing minimization 
procedures require that any intercepted communication with a 
United States person, and any information obtained about a United 
States person, must be destroyed unless it has foreign intelligence 
value.134 
As the Committee of Experts commissioned by the President 
found, Section 702 allows the government to target foreigners 
abroad under a lower standard than if the target was an American 
abroad or a foreigner in the U.S. communicating with an American 
in the U.S.135  It is often difficult to determine whether the e-mail 
address, Internet communication, or telephone number of the non-
targeted participant in a legally acquired communication belongs 
to a United States person, because that information often is not 
apparent on the face of the communication.  Thus, there is a risk 
that communications involving United States persons will not be 
purged, and instead will be retained in a government database.136  
Furthermore, the very concept of information of “foreign 
intelligence value” is vague and can easily lead to the preservation 
of private information about known United States persons whose 
communications are incidentally intercepted in the course of a 
legal Section 702 interception.137 
FISC proceedings are non-adversarial, and there is no 
representation before the FISA Court of the interests of the data 
subject during the consideration of an application for an order.138  
In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court has established that neither 
individuals nor organizations have standing to bring a lawsuit 
under Section 702 because they cannot know whether they have 
been subject to surveillance or not.139  The orders of the FISC are 
                                                     
134  NAT’L SEC. AGENCY, MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES USED BY THE NATIONAL 
SECURITY AGENCY IN CONNECTION WITH ACQUISITIONS OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE 
INFORMATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE 
SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978, AS AMENDED, § 5(1) (2011). 
135  LIBERTY REPORT, supra note 93, at 148 (arguing that the current approach 
does not adequately protect the privacy of United States persons whose 
communications are incidentally acquired). 
136  Id. at 149. 
137 Id.  
138  EUR. COMM’N,  REPORT ON THE FINDINGS BY THE EU CO-CHAIRS OF THE AD 
HOC EU-US WORKING GROUP ON DATA PROTECTION 16, (Nov. 27, 2013) [hereinafter 
AD HOC EU-U.S. WORKING GROUP REPORT], available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/files/report-findings-of-the-ad-hoc-
eu-us-working-group-on-data-protection.pdf.  
139  Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013) (Breyer, J., 
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classified, and companies are required to maintain secrecy 
regarding the assistance they are required to provide, which means 
that there are no avenues, judicial or administrative, for either U.S. 
or EU data subjects to be informed of whether their personal data 
is being collected or further processed. 140   There are thus no 
opportunities for individuals to obtain access, rectification or 
erasure of data, or administrative or judicial redress.141  Although 
“there is judicial oversight for activities that imply a capacity to 
compel information[,] . . . [t]here is no judicial approval of 
individual selectors to query the data collected under Section 215 
or tasked for collection under section 702.”142  The FISC operates ex 
parte, and in camera, issuing classified opinions unless they are 
declassified.143 
From the European point of view, the program under Section 
702 violates the principle of reciprocity.  As the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs of the European Parliament notes, although the 
Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution does not apply to non-
U.S. citizens, the European legal framework does not discriminate 
on the basis of citizenship for the rights that it protects, among 
which is the right to privacy.144 
                                                     
dissenting) (holding that Amnesty International did not have standing to 
challenge Section 702).  
140  AD HOC EU-U.S. WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 138, at 17.  
141  Id. 
142  Id. at 18.   
143  Id.  
144  See Working Document on Mass Surveillance, supra note 12, at 2; see also 
LIBERTY REPORT, supra note 93, at 156–57 (outlining three proposals by the 
Committee commissioned by the President that are not fully satisfactory from the 
European point of view).  The Committee suggests that there should be “three 
primary differences between the standards governing the acquisition of 
communications of United States persons and non-United States persons” which 
are warranted by the special obligation the U.S. government owes to its people:  
First, United States persons [should] be targeted only upon a showing of 
probable cause, whereas non-United States persons [should] be targeted 
upon a showing of reasonable belief.  Second, United States persons 
[should] be targeted only if there is a judicial warrant from the FISC 
whereas non-United States persons [should] be targeted without . . . 
warrant, but with careful after-the-fact review and oversight.  Third, the 
minimization requirements for communications of United States persons 
would not extend fully to non-United States persons located outside the 
United States, but importantly, information collected about such persons 
[should] not be disseminated unless it is relevant to the national security 
of the United States or [its] allies.   
Id. 
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The Committee on Foreign Affairs also recommends that in the 
absence of a specific and compelling showing, the U.S. government 
should follow the model of the Department of Homeland Security 
and apply the Privacy Act of 1974 in the same way to both U.S. and 
non-U.S. persons.145  The Privacy Act of 1974 provides what are 
known as “privacy fair information practices” for systems of 
records held by federal agencies.146  These practices are designed to 
safeguard personal privacy, and include a set of legal requirements 
meant to ensure both the accuracy and security of personally 
identifiable information in a system of records.147  
Presently, there are fewer safeguards for EU citizens in the U.S., 
as well as a lower threshold for the collection of their personal 
                                                     
145  The Privacy Act regulates the federal government’s collection, use, and 
disclosure of all types of personal information.  5 U.S.C. § 552(a).  The law applies 
to the government’s collection of all kinds of personal data concerning “education, 
financial transactions, medical history, and criminal or employment history and 
that contains his name, or the identifying number, symbol, or other identifying 
particular assigned to the individual, such as a finger or voice print or a 
photograph.”  Id. § 552a(a)(4).  The Act is generally less protective than European 
legislation on the same issues and contains many exceptions in particular for law 
enforcement agencies and the CIA.  Id. § 552a(j).  Although the NSA does not 
qualify for a general exemption, it can refer to the specific exemption for national 
security records under NSA/Central Security Service Privacy Act Program, 32 
C.F.R. § 322 (2006).  Id. § 552a(k)(2).  
146  This law provides protection analogous to the ones European nations 
follow under Directive 95/46.  See Francesca Bignami, European Versus American 
Liberty: A Comparative Privacy Analysis of Antiterrorism Data Mining, 48 B.C. L. REV. 
609, 632 (2007) (noting that the Privacy Act regulates government use of data from 
“start to finish.”). 
147  LIBERTY REPORT, supra note 93, at 158.  According to the Privacy Policy 
Guidance Memorandum of the Department of Homeland Security, the Privacy 
Act must apply in the same way to both U.S. persons and non-U.S. persons.  As 
stated in the Memorandum, personally identifiable information (“PII”) that is 
collected, used, maintained, and/or disseminated in connection with a mixed 
system by DHS shall be treated as a System of Records subject to the Privacy Act 
regardless of whether the information pertains to a U.S. citizen, legal permanent 
resident, visitor, or alien.  This means that non-U.S. persons have the right to 
access their PII and the right to amend their records, absent an exemption under 
the Privacy Act.  Because of statutory limitations, the policy does not extend or 
create a right of judicial review for non-U.S. persons.  Intelligence agencies today 
are covered by the Privacy Act, and are granted exemptions to accommodate their 
need to protect matters that are properly classified, law-enforcement sensitive, or 
investigatory in nature.  The NSA has filed twenty-six systems of records notices 
advising the public about data collections, including from applicants seeking 
employment, contractors doing business with the agency, and in order to conduct 
background investigations.  Memorandum No. 2011–01 from the Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec., Privacy Policy Guidance Memorandum of the Department of 
Homeland Security 2 (Feb. 11, 2011).  
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data.148  The procedures regarding targeting and minimization of 
data collection apply only to U.S. citizens.  Similarly, the 
constitutional protections of the First and Fourth Amendments do 
not apply to EU citizens that do not reside in the U.S.  For the 
Commission, there is a lack of clarity concerning some available 
U.S. legal bases for authorizing data collection, such as Executive 
Order 12333, concerning the existence of other surveillance 
programs, as well as limitations applicable to these programs.149  
The Commission also finds that while there is a degree of oversight 
by the three branches of government that applies in specific cases 
including judicial oversight, for activities that imply a capacity to 
compel information there is no judicial approval for how the data 
collected is queried.  Judges are not asked to approve the ‘selectors’ 
or analyze the criteria employed to examine the data and mine 
usable pieces of information.150  Nor is there judicial oversight of 
the collection of foreign intelligence outside the U.S., which is 
conducted under the sole competency of the Executive Branch.151 
As the European Commission notes, the legal framework of the 
U.S. intelligence collection programs needs more transparency. 
This includes interpretation by U.S. courts, as well as clarification 
on the quantitative dimension of U.S. intelligence collection 
programs. 152   The European Commission also requested an 
extension of the safeguards available to U.S. citizens and residents 
to EU citizens not residing in the U.S., an increase in the 
transparency of intelligence activities, and further strengthening of 
oversight.153  The European Commission further suggested that the 
role of the FISC should be strengthened by “introducing remedies 
for individuals . . . [which] could reduce the processing of personal 
data of Europeans that are not relevant for national security 
purposes.”154 
 
                                                     
      148    European Commission Memo, supra note 13, at 9 (noting the different 
processing safeguards for EU citizens and U.S. citizens). 
       149    AD HOC EU-U.S. WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 138, at 17.  
150  Id. at 10, 18. 
151  Id. at 18.  
152  Id. at 7.  
153  Rebuilding Trust, supra note 77, at 7.  
154  See European Commission Memo, supra note 13, at 7. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol36/iss2/3
TOURKOCHORITI (DO NOT DELETE) 4/17/2015  4:38 PM 
2014] EUROPEAN DATA PRIVACY REGULATION 491 
3. FILLING IN THE GAPS IN THE PROTECTION 
 
The Charter of Fundamental rights of the European Union has 
an explicit clause protecting personal data155  in addition to the 
clause guaranteeing respect for private and family life.156   The 
system of data protection in the EU is composed of Directives 
95/46 and 2002/58 in the telecommunications sector, Regulation 
45/20001 and Directive 2006/24 regarding the field of police and 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters, and Framework Decision 
2008/977/JHA.157  The proposed regulation, however, establishes a 
stricter regime of privacy protection within the EU, harmonizing 
the existing national legislation that has been used to implement 
Directive 95/46.158  However, the remaining question is whether 
the large scale collection and processing of personal information 
under U.S. surveillance programs is necessary and proportionate to 
meet the national security interests.159  If interpreted properly, this 
principle of proportionality – omnipresent in the European 
Convention and in article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the EU – could result in the important protection of data.   
Expressing a fundamental principle of the rule of law, which is 
as old as Aristotle, is universalizable.160  For Aristotle, justice was a 
matter of the right proportion between two extremes, an 
“intermediate between a sort of gain and a sort of loss.” 161 
                                                     
155  Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 52, 2000 O.J. 
(C 364) 1 [hereinafter Charter of Fundamental Rights] (stating “[a]ny limitation on 
the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognized by this Charter must be 
provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms.  Subject 
to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are 
necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the 
Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others.”). 
156  Id. art. 7 (stating “[e]veryone has the right to respect for his or her private 
and family life, home and communications.”).  
157  Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA, of November 2008 on the 
Protection of Personal Data Processed in the Framework of Police and Judicial 
Cooperation in Criminal Matters, 2008 O.J. (L 350) 60.  
158  Proposed Regulation, supra note 3, at 4 (harmonizing the rules 
purportedly increased legal certainty and reduced impediments to global 
operations).  
159  Rebuilding Trust, supra note 77, at 4. 
160  For Aristotle, in a world of contingence and perpetual flux, justice is a 
matter of right proportion.  The right proportion is defined as the intermediate 
between two extremes.  See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, in THE COMPLETE 
WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1785 (Jonathan Barnes ed., 1984).  
161  Id. at 1787–89. Further,  
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According to the principle of proportionality, limitations to 
individual freedoms must be necessary and appropriate to achieve 
their function, and they must use the least intrusive instruments 
possible to achieve the desired result.  Since finding the right 
proportion is also a matter of interpretation, the principle by itself 
is dependent on the ad hoc evaluations and concerns of justices in 
association with the margin of appreciation of the state – another 
principle used by the European Court of Human Rights 
(“ECtHR”). 
 
3.1.  New EU Regulation Strengthening the Protection of Data 
Privacy in the Private Sector and the Changes It Brings 
 
The proposed regulation has the potential to indirectly limit the 
amount of information that ends up in the government’s hands by 
limiting the amount of information that private actors can collect, 
process, and store.162  Its clauses are so radical that it has been 
criticized as carrying a potential for destabilizing the current status 
quo.163  For example, it will force the Safe Harbor principles to be 
redefined as principles used only for the possibility of notice and 
choice, and will focus less on the amount of information retained 
and processed.  Although the new regulation contains a national 
security exception by limiting the private information in the hands 
of the private sector, it may indirectly limit the possibilities of state 
surveillance.  
                                                     
[t]he man who acts unjustly has too much, and the man who is unjustly 
treated too little, of what is good.  In the case of evil the reverse is true; 
for the lesser evil is reckoned a good in comparison with the greater evil, 
since the lesser evil is rather to be chosen than the greater, and what is 
worthy of choice is good, and what is worthier of choice a greater good.  
 Id. at 1786.  
162  The Committee for Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) of the 
European Parliament overwhelmingly backed the European Commission’s data 
protection reform proposals.  The LIBE vote gave a mandate to the rapporteurs to 
negotiate with the Council of the EU.  President Barroso underlined the 
importance of the reform and called for a swift adoption before the end of this 
parliamentary term.  See Memorandum from the Eur. Comm’n, LIBE Committee 
Vote Backs New EU Data Protection Rules (Oct. 22, 2013) [hereinafter LIBE 
Committee Vote], available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-
923_en.htm. 
163  Schwartz, supra note 39, at 1994. 
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            The Regulation develops a “right to be forgotten”164 should 
a number of conditions apply and elaborates stricter requirements 
before “consent” can be used as a justification for data 
processing.165  The right to be forgotten is described as the right of 
data subjects to have their personal data erased and no longer 
processed, and to obtain from third parties the erasure of any links 
to, or copies or replication of, that data: 
 
[W]here . . . the data are no longer necessary in relation to 
the purposes for which they were collected or otherwise 
processed; . . . the data subject withdraws consent on 
which the processing is based[;] . . . the data subject 
objects to the processing of personal data; [or] the 
processing of the data does not comply with this 
Regulation . . . .166 
 
As it stands, this means that if an EU national complains to a 
supervising authority, the supervising authority can order and 
enforce any processor to, for example, erase material that concerns 
that national.167  The Court of Justice of the EU recently held that 
even the operator of a search engine like Google engages in 
activities that “must be classified as ‘processing’ within the 
meaning of [Article 2(b) of Directive 95/46]” since the engine 
                                                     
164  Proposed Regulation, supra note 3, art. 17(1), at 51 (“The data subject shall 
have the right to obtain from the controller the erasure of personal data relating to 
them and the abstention from further dissemination of such data . . . .”).  
165  Id. art. 7 (requiring, among other things, that any written consent form 
must be presented to the subject independently).  
166  See LIBE Committee Vote, supra note 162, at Commission Proposal, art. 17.  
This right is particularly relevant when the data subject has given their consent as 
a child, when not being fully aware of the risks involved by the processing, and 
later wants to remove such personal data, especially on the Internet.  The further 
retention of the data, however, should be allowed where it is necessary for 
historical, statistical and scientific research purposes; for reasons of public interest 
in the area of public health; and for exercising the right of freedom of expression 
when required by law, or where there is a reason to restrict the processing of the 
data instead of erasing them.  Proposed Regulation, supra note 3, at Proposed 
Regulation Recital, 53. 
167  Sam Schechner, Google Sued in Europe-Privacy Test Case, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 
4, 2013), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323623304579055271398748940.h
tml  (describing the privacy case brought against Google by former Formula One 
racing president Max Mosley).  
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collects data which it eventually makes publicly available.168  In 
exploring the Internet automatically, constantly, and systematically 
in search of published information, “the operator of a search 
engine ‘collects’ such data which it subsequently ‘retrieves,’ 
‘records,’ and ‘organises’ within the framework of its indexing 
programmes, ‘stores’ on its servers and, as the case may be, 
‘discloses’ and ‘makes available’ to its users in the form of lists of 
search results.”169  The fact that the search engine operator applies 
this process to both non-personal and personal data and does not 
distinguish between the two is not significant for the court.170  Also 
insignificant is the fact that the search engine is merely 
reorganizing and displaying data that is already published 
somewhere else on the Internet.171  Search engines are “controllers” 
in the sense that they direct and determine the purpose and means 
of that activity, and process personal data within the framework of 
that activity. 172   They also play “a decisive role in the overall 
dissemination of those data” as they “render[] the latter accessible 
to any Internet user making a search on the basis of the data 
subject’s name, including to Internet users who otherwise would 
not have found the web page on which those data are 
published.”173  Although publishers of websites have the option of 
indicating to search engine operators that they wish specific 
information published on their site to be wholly or partially 
excluded, this does not mean that the operator of a search engine is 
released from its responsibility for the processing of personal data 
that it carries out in the context of the engine’s activity.174 
Another measure that the new regulation imposes is the prior 
approval of supervising authority for any processing of personal 
data.175   This means that the data protection authorities whose 
                                                     
168  Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de 
Protección de Datos (AEPD), 2014 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 317 (May 13, 2014), § 
28, available at 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=152065&pag
eIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=103833. 
169  Id. § 28. 
170  Id. 
171  Id. §§ 28–30.   
172  Id. § 33. 
173  Id. § 36. 
174  Id. § 39.  
175  Proposed Regulation, supra note 3, art. 34, § 3.4.6.2.  The European 
Parliament gave its support to the Commission’s proposal to have a “one-stop 
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powers also cover the public sector must be consulted for any data 
collection program even in order to establish that the national 
security exception applies.176  The regulation further establishes a 
right to object to processing for marketing purposes 177  and the 
right not to be subject to profiling.178  This is defined as automated 
processing intended to evaluate certain personal aspects relating to 
a person or his or her performance at work, economic situation, 
location, health, personal preferences, reliability, or behavior for 
use in targeted ads.179   The directive predicts some exceptions, 
including those related to public security, prevention, 
investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences of 
economic or financial interest, in particular.180  However, the right 
not to be subject to profiling by the private sector implies an 
inability of the government to conduct data mining and obtain 
data concerning an individual from the private sector. 
The new regulation requires controllers and processors to 
“implement appropriate technical and organizational measures to 
ensure a level of security appropriate to the risks represented by 
the processing and the nature of the personal data to be 
protected.” 181  The regulation empowers the state supervisory 
authorities to impose administrative sanctions, which may reach 
up to five percent of the annual worldwide turnover to enterprises 
violating its clauses.182 
The regulation defines its territorial scope as covering the 
“processing of personal data in the context of the activities of a . . . 
controller or a processor in the Union,” whether the processing 
                                                     
shop” for companies that operate in several EU countries, and for consumers who 
want to complain against a company established in a country other than their 
own.  Companies will have to deal with a single national data protection authority 
in the country where they are based.  Proposed Regulation, supra note 3, Proposed 
Regulation Recital, at 98. 
176  See infra Part 3.3 (describing the case law of the European Court of 
Human Rights, which concerns the requirements that the legislation establishing a 
data collection program must meet).  
177  Proposed Regulation, supra note 3, art. 19, § 2.  
178  Id. art. 20, § 2. 
       179    Id.   
       180    Id. art. 21(1)(a-c). 
181  Id. art. 30, § 1.  
182  Id. art. 79, § 2(c) (following European Parliament’s Vote).  The European 
Commission’s initial proposal, before the Snowden revelations, was for fines up to 
two percent of annual turnover.  Id. art. 6.  
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takes place in the EU or not.183  It also applies to the processing of 
personal data of subjects in the EU by a controller or a processor, 
not established in the EU, where the processing activities are 
related to the offering of goods or services irrespective of payment 
to subjects in the EU or to the monitoring of data subjects.184  On 
the basis of this clause, and given the radical nature of the new 
regulation, the Safe Harbor Agreement must be reformed.185  These 
clauses can significantly affect the amount of information retained 
by U.S. authorities, as they obtain it from the private sector 
through the data mining processes. 
Thus, since the EU regulations do not apply in cases of national 
security, data collected in violation of the existing directive and the 
proposed regulation in the EU pertaining to national security will 
be appropriated by surveillance authorities.  If the private sector 
possesses information in violation of the EU’s existing regulation 
that is handed over to the state, the individuals are not protected 
by the existing regulation.  The regulation should be interpreted as 
allowing for sanctions on the private actors who are violating these 
clauses because this is material they were not allowed to collect in 
the first place.  Although citizens cannot be protected against the 
state, in order for the protection to make sense in the future, the 
private actors should pay the penalties set forth in the regulation.186 
While there are sparse U.S. state laws offering varying degrees 
of security and certainty, there is no U.S. federal regulation on data 
privacy protection for consumers.187  Thus, the EU Commission has 
announced that once the new regulation obtains legal force, it 
expects the U.S. to implement a single and coherent set of data 
protection rules in order “to create a stable basis for personal data 
flows between the EU and the U.S.,” considering that “[i]nter-
                                                     
183  Id. art. 3, § 1 (following European Parliament’s Vote); see also LIBE 
Committee Vote, supra note 162. 
184   Proposed Regulation, supra note 3, art. 3, § 2 (following European 
Parliament’s Vote); see also LIBE Committee Vote, supra note 162. 
185    See also Rebuilding Trust, supra note 77, at 7.  The proposed regulation 
contains exceptions to the prohibition of the processing of personal data.  
However, proposed regulation article 9(1), among others, notes that the 
“processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public 
interest, on the basis of Union law, or Member State law which shall provide for 
suitable measures to safeguard the data subject’s legitimate interests.”  Proposed 
Regulation, supra note 3, art. 9, § 2(g). 
186  Id. art. 9(2)(j). 
187  Similarly, there is no common definition of personal information.  See 
supra Part 1.  
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operability and a system of self-regulation is not enough.  The 
existence of a set of strong and enforceable data protection rules in 
both the EU and U.S. would constitute a solid basis for cross-
border data flows.”188  
 
3.2. Data Retention Directive 
 
The data retention directive aims to harmonize Member States’ 
data retention provisions in order to enhance protection of 
privacy. 189   These provisions dictate provider obligations 
concerning publicly available electronic communication services 
and public communication networks, with respect to the retention 
of certain data generated or processed by these providers for the 
purpose of investigation, detection, and prosecution of serious 
crimes.190  In this respect, the Directive operates as an exception to 
the protective regime in the telecommunications sector guaranteed 
by Directive 2002/58,191 complementing the principles established 
by Directive 95/46.  The Court of Justice of the European Union 
recently ruled that the data retention directive is invalid because it 
does not contain enough guarantees for the protection of data 
privacy.192  In this respect, it followed the findings of the Advocate 
                                                     
188  European Commission Memo, supra note 13, at 8. 
189  Council  Directive 2006/24/EC, of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 15 March 2006 on the Retention of Data Generated or Processed in 
Connection with the Provision of Publicly Available Electronic Communications 
Services or of Public Communications Networks and Amending Directive 
2002/58/EC, 2006 O.J. (L 105) 54, pmbl., ¶¶ 5–10 [hereinafter Council  Directive 
2006/24/EC]. 
190  See id. at 54, 56. 
191  Council Directive 2002/58/EC, of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 12 July 2002 Concerning the Processing of Personal Data and the 
Protection of Privacy in the Electronic Communications Sector (Directive on 
Privacy and Electronic Communications), 2002 O.J. (L 201) 37, amended by 
Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 
2006, and by Directive 2009/136/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 25 November 2009, 2009 O.J. (L 337) 37.  
192  Joined Cases C-293 & C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd. v. Minister for 
Commc’ns, Marine and Natural Res. and Kärntner Landesregierung et al., 2013 
EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 1 at 157 (Dec. 12, 2013) [hereinafter Digital Rights Ireland 
Ltd.], available at 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document_print.jsf?doclang=EN&docid
=145562.  
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General of the Court of Justice, almost verbatim.193 
The Directive applies to traffic and location data on legal 
entities and natural persons.194   It does not, however, apply to 
electronic communications, including information derived from 
using an electronic communications network. 195   It leaves the 
Member States the option to define the procedures to be followed 
and the conditions to be fulfilled in order to gain access to retained 
data. In doing so, the Member States are required to act in 
accordance with necessity and proportionality, subject to the 
relevant provisions of EU Law or public international law, and in 
particular the European Convention of Human Rights (“ECHR”) as 
interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights.196  The data 
to be retained is necessary to trace and identify the source of a 
communication:  actual telephone numbers, and the names and 
addresses of subscribers or registered users that have fixed 
network or mobile telephones.197  This retention practice allows for 
                                                     
193 Cf. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BvR] [German Constitutional Court] Mar. 
2, 2010, 1 BvR 256/08, 2 (Ger.)  (decision of the German Federal Constitutional 
Court, holding that the implementing legislation did not set out appropriate 
safeguards concerning data security and limitation of legitimate use of the 
retained data); FRANZISKA BOEHM & MARK D. COLE, DATA RETENTION AFTER THE 
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (2014) (describing the 
decision of the Romanian Federal Constitutional Court, which found that the 
continuous limitation of the right to privacy, foreseen in the Data Retention 
Directive, makes the essence of the right); PI. ÚS 24/10, 22.03.2011 [Czech 
Republic Constitutional Court Judgment of Mar. 22, 2011], Data Retention in 
Telecommunication Services (Czech.) (decision of the Czech Republic’s 
Constitutional Court, annulling part of the Act on Electronic Communication, and 
legally nullifying the obligation to retain traffic and location data and to make this 
data available to competent authorities).  See generally Arianna Vedaschi & Valerio 
Lubello, Presentation at the Harvard Law School Roundtable: Constitutionalism 
Across Borders and the Struggle Against Terrorism: Data Retention and its 
Implications for the Fundamental Right to Privacy (Mar. 6–7, 2014).  
       194   Council  Directive 2006/24/EC, supra note 189, art. 1, § 2.  
195  Id.  
196  Id. art. 4. 
197  Id. art. 5, § 1(a)(1).  Article 5, § 1(a)(2) further specifies that the user ID(s) 
allocated to a person’s email address or Internet connection may be retained, as 
well as the name and address of the subscriber or registered user and “the user ID 
and telephone number allocated to any communication entering the public 
telephone network.”  Id. art. 5, §1(a)(2)(ii).  The directive also covers the data 
necessary to identify the destination of a communication, the numbers dialed and 
re-routed, names of subscribers and users, user IDs or telephone numbers, names 
and addresses of subscribers or registered users, and the user IDs of recipients for 
Internet email and telephone.  Id. art. 5, § 1(b).  It also covers the data necessary to 
identify the date, time, and duration of a communication.  Id. art. 5, § 1(c).  Data 
necessary to identify the type of communication such as the telephone and 
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information to be retained for six months to two years from the 
date of the communication.198  The directive establishes conditions 
of storage and access to the data,199 and makes the national Data 
Protection Authorities responsible for monitoring its application 
regarding the security of the stored data.200  
For the Court, although the retention of data satisfies an 
objective of general interest in the prevention of offenses and the 
fight against terrorism, it is an interference that is not 
proportionate to this legitimate objective. 201   According to the 
Court, the Directive does not define the limits of the competent 
national authorities’ access to the data and their subsequent use for 
the purposes of prevention, detection, or criminal prosecutions.202  
The Directive does not contain substantive and procedural 
conditions relating to the access of the competent national 
authorities to the data and to their subsequent use, limiting it to 
what is strictly necessary in light of the objective pursued.203  By 
not laying down clear and precise rules governing the extent of the 
interference with the fundamental rights enshrined in Articles 7 
and 8 of the Charter, it does not provide for sufficient safeguards 
as required by Article 8 of the Charter against abuse and “any 
unlawful access and use of that data.”204  Finally, the Court notes 
that the Directive does not require the data in question to be 
retained within the European Union, with the result that the 
control of compliance by the requirements of protection and 
security by the data protection authorities is not fully ensured.205  
The Advocate General noted that the Directive constitutes a 
“particularly serious interference with the right to privacy,”206 as 
                                                     
Internet service used may also be retained under Article 5, § 1(d) and data 
necessary to identify users’ communication equipment is covered under Article 5, 
§ 1(e).  Id.  Information necessary to identify the location of mobile communication 
equipment is covered by Article 5,  § 1(f).  Id.  
198  Id. art. 6.   
199  Id. art. 7. 
200  Id. art. 9.  
201  Digital Rights Ireland Ltd., supra note 192.  
202  Id. at 8.  
203  Id. at 20 (“[The legislature] should have required a case-by-case 
examination of requests for access in order to limit the data provided to what is 
strictly necessary.”). 
204  Id. at 18–19.  
205  Id. at 26. 
206  Id. ¶ 67, at 12.  
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2015
TOURKOCHORITI (DO NOT DELETE) 4/17/2015  4:38 PM 
500 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 36:2 
the retention of data in the hands of the private sector may lead to 
its “outsourcing” with further dangers for the right to privacy207 in 
violation of even the rules of Directive 2006/24.208  This risk is 
increased by the fact that the Directive does not require that data 
be physically stored in the EU, which creates jurisdictional 
difficulties that contribute to its potential to interfere with 
privacy.209  This constitutes a “serious interference” with the right 
to privacy, which is not proportionate sensu stricto to the objective 
relating to the need to ensure the functioning of the internal 
market.210  
The European Union legislature should have made several 
changes to the Directive.  First, the legislature should have defined 
the principles that must govern the collection of data, as this is an 
exception from the guarantees laid down in the system of 
protection of privacy of the existing directives.211  Second, “the EU 
should have provided a more precise description than ‘serious 
crime’ as an indication of the criminal activities which are capable 
of justifying access of the competent national authorities to the data 
collected and retained.” 212   Third, the EU should have limited 
access to the data. This could have been accomplished by granting 
access “if not solely to judicial authorities, at least to independent 
authorities, or, failing that, by making any request for access 
subject to review by the judicial authorities or independent 
authorities . . . .”  Fourth, the EU “should have required a case-by-
case examination of requests for access in order to limit the data 
provided to what is strictly necessary.”213  Fifth, the EU should 
have laid down “the principle that Member States may provide for 
exceptions preventing access to retained data in certain exceptional 
                                                     
207  Id. at 13–14.  In this instance, the Advocate General is alluding to the NSA 
collection of materials through the Internet.  
208  Id. 
209  Id. at 13. 
210  Id. at 16 (”[T]he intensity of the intervention in the area of regulation of 
fundamental rights . . . is manifestly disproportionate to the objective relating to 
the need to ensure the functioning of the internal market . . . .”).  The principle of 
proportionality in limiting freedoms is consecrated in article 52(1)  of the Charter 
of the European Union.  Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union art. 52, Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 389, 391.  
211  Digital Rights Ireland Ltd., supra note 192, at 19–20 (noting that the EU 
could and should have incorporated principles concomitant with the directive, 
which would have helped define the extent of the interference to privacy). 
       212    Id. at 20 (footnote omitted).  
213  Id. (footnote omitted). 
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circumstances.”  Sixth, and last, the EU “should have established 
the principle that authorities authorised to access the data are 
required, first, to erase them once their usefulness has been 
exhausted” and “notify the persons concerned of that access, at 
least retrospectively . . . .”214  Thus, the investigation, detection, and 
prosecution of serious crime, while pursuing a legitimate objective, 
allows for a disproportionate amount of time of retention. The 
Advocate General found no reason to extend the data retention 
period to over one year.215 
 
3.3. Council of Europe and Barriers of Protection 
 
The European Commission is requesting the U.S. to accede to 
the Council of Europe’s Convention for the Protection of 
Individuals, “with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal 
Data . . . , as it acceded to the 2001 Convention on Cybercrime.”216  
The convention states a number of principles that exist in the EU 
directives and the proposed regulation.  According to these 
principles, data must be  
 
(a) obtained and processed fairly and lawfully; (b) stored 
for specified and legitimate purposes and not used in a way 
incompatible with those purposes; (c) adequate, relevant 
and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they 
are stored; (d) accurate and, where necessary, kept up to 
date; [and] (e) preserved in a form which permits 
identification of the data subjects for no longer than is 
required for the purpose for which those data are stored.217   
                                                     
214  Id.  The Advocate General also cites Framework Decision 2008/977 of the 
European Parliament, which guarantees the protection of personal data processed 
in the framework of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, and 
provides for guarantees of that kind in the context of data transmitted between 
Member States.  
215  Id. at 23 (distinguishing ‘present time’ with ‘historical time’ and stating 
that data retention beyond one year would not be justified by any countervailing 
benefits). 
216  European Commission Memo, supra note 13, at 8. 
217 Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic 
Processing of Personal Data, art. 5, Jan. 28, 1981 [hereinafter EC Treaty], available at 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/108.htm.  The convention 
prohibits processing of special categories of data, unless domestic law provides 
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The convention foresees the possibility for a remedy in cases 
where a processor refuses to inform a person as to whether 
personal data has been stored, in cases of failure to communicate 
the data, and in cases of failure to obtain rectification or erasure of 
data if they have been processed contrary to the abovementioned 
prohibitions.218  The treaty allows a party to prohibit, subject to 
authorization, the trans-border flow of certain categories of 
personal data under specific regulation if the other party does not 
provide equivalent protection.219  A party may also prohibit the 
transfer of the same data through the intermediary of the territory 
of another party when the transfer aims to circumvent the 
legislation of the party prohibiting the circulation of data. 220  
Presently, the NSA massive metadata collection program meets 
none of these requirements. 
The ECtHR has issued a number of decisions concerning 
surveillance, some of which are more promising than others.  The 
conditions of ordering telecommunication surveillance to intercept 
the content of communications in Europe are less strict than in the 
U.S., where a judicial order or a warrant is required.221  In Klass v. 
                                                     
appropriate safeguards.  Article 6 outlaws the prohibition of personal data 
revealing racial origin, political opinions or religious or other beliefs, data 
concerning health or sexual life, and data relating to criminal convictions. 
218  EC Treaty, supra note 217, art. 8. 
219  Id. art. 12, § 3 (a). 
220  Id. art. 12, § 3 (b).  
221 See 50 U.S.C. § 1805 (2006)  (noting that FISA authorizes the interception of 
real time wire, oral, and electronic communications when the government 
demonstrates to the FISA Court that there is probable cause to believe that the 
target of the electronic surveillance is a foreign power, or agent of a foreign 
power, and that each of the facilities where electronic surveillance is directed or 
used, or is about to be used, is by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power).  
A classified executive order of the former President circumvented FISA by 
authorizing a series of warrantless access to international telephone calls and 
electronic communications even when one party was a U.S. person located in the 
U.S.  This government access developed through a public-private partnership in 
which the NSA was informally arranged with top officials from 
telecommunications companies to gain access to communications without 
warrants or court orders.  See Stephanie K. Pell, Systematic Government Access to 
Private-Sector Data in the United States, 2 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 245, 249–50 (2012) 
(“Consistent with Fourth Amendment doctrine, law enforcement normally must 
get a warrant in order to search and seize a laptop, desktop, or thumb drive.  In 
1986, Congress extended the warrant protection via statute to communications 
content stored in an ECS (such as unopened email), but did not extend full 
warrant protections to communications content in RCS storage.”) (footnotes 
omitted).  In a white paper submitted to Congress, the administration founded 
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Germany, the Court held that the exclusion of judicial control in 
ordering surveillance measures “does not exceed the limits of what 
may be deemed necessary in a democratic society.” 222  There, the 
initial control was affected by an official “qualified for judicial 
office” with oversight from a Parliamentary Board and the G-10 
Commission as set up by the legislation.223  The G-10 Commission 
is composed of a Chairman qualified to hold a judicial office and 
two independent assessors.224   For the Court, the Parliamentary 
Board has a balanced membership, as government opposition is 
represented and thus “able to participate in the control of the 
measures ordered by the competent Minister who is responsible to 
the Bundestag.”225  Because the Parliament is an extension of the 
executive in Europe, this decision is not satisfactory.  Unlike the 
U.S. government, where frequent elections of the two chambers of 
Congress allow for the coexistence of an executive with an 
opposite majority in either of the chambers of congress, the nature 
of many Parliaments of European states lends itself more easily to 
partisan control.  The balanced membership of the Board 
composed by representatives of all political parties represented in 
the Parliament is not a sufficient guarantee, as politicians are not 
guaranteed to operate with objectivity and independence.  
Although there can be no recourse to the courts in respect to 
ordering and implementing restrictive measures – meaning that a 
warrant is not required to intercept a person’s communications – 
the Court finds satisfactory that there are other remedies available, 
such as complaining to the Commission that orders and executes 
surveillance measures and to the Constitutional Court. 226  
                                                     
this presidential authority through his constitutional powers under Article II of 
the U.S. Constitution, and through the authorization for the use of military force, 
which was enacted by Congress in the immediate aftermath of September 11.  See 
also U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Legal Authorities Supporting the Activities of the 
National Security Agency Described by the President (Jan. 19, 2006).  
222  Klass v. Germany, App. No. 5029/71 Eur. Ct. H.R. 20–21, ¶ 56 (1978) 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57510.  
       223    Id.  
224  Id ¶¶ 20–21, at 7–8.  The above-mentioned Board of five Members of 
Parliament appoints the Commission members for the current term of the 
Bundestag after consultation with the Government. They are “completely 
independent in the exercise of their functions and cannot be subject to 
instructions.”  Id.  
225  Id. ¶ 56, at 20–21. 
226  Id. ¶ 70, at 26 (reasoning that an individual does have some recourse if 
she believes that she is under surveillance, albeit not to the courts).   
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However, the Court also noted that information obtained through 
secret surveillance must be destroyed “as soon as they are no 
longer needed to achieve the required purpose.”227 
Nevertheless, there are important legal tools in the European 
Convention of Human Rights, and the methodology of its 
interpretation, which if used properly can be protective.  The Court 
has held in a number of cases that the storage of personal data can 
constitute an interference with the right to respect private life 
under ECHR article 8(1) even if there is no evidence that the data 
was used to the detriment of the data subject or even at all.228 
With regard to data withheld by surveillance authorities, the 
Court has held that surveillance of citizens is tolerable only if it is 
“strictly necessary for safeguarding the democratic institutions.”229  
Domestic law concerning how public authorities file information 
about a citizen’s private life must be defined with sufficient 
precision and must contain safeguards against abuses.230  The law 
must be accessible and foreseeable to the person concerned.  In 
addition, it must define the kind of information that may be 
recorded, the categories of people against whom surveillance 
measures (such as gathering and keeping information) may be 
taken, the circumstances in which such measures may be taken or 
the procedure to be followed, as well as the length of time for 
which the information should be kept.231   
The Court has similarly held that the law must clearly indicate 
the scope and manner of exercise of the discretion conferred on the 
domestic authorities to collect and store in the Surveillance Data 
base information on persons’ private lives. 232   This discretion 
                                                     
227  Id. ¶ 52, at 19.  
228  See Amann v. Switzerland, App. No. 27798/95, 2000-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 201, 
238 (2000) (noting that “it is sufficient for [the Court] to find that data relating to 
the private life of an individual were stored by a public authority to conclude that, 
in the instant case, the creation and storing of the impugned card amounted to an 
interference, within the meaning of Article 8, with the applicant’s right to respect 
for his private life.”).  Id. ¶ 70. 
229  Rotaru v. Romania, App. No. 28341/95, 2000-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 61, 82 (2000), 
¶ 47. 
230  Id.  
231  Id. ¶¶ 42–63 (holding that records containing information about an 
individual’s life, studies, political activities, criminal record, constitutes an 
invasion of private life and thus violate article 8 of the European Convention of 
Human Rights). 
      232     Shimovolos v. Russia, App. No. 30194/09, Eur. Ct. H.R. 16, ¶¶ 69–70 
(2011), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-105217.  
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includes information coming from wire-tapping such as the 
grounds for registration of a person’s name in the database, the 
authorities competent to order such registration; the duration of 
the measure, the precise nature of the data collected, the 
procedures for storing and using the collected data, and the 
existing controls and guarantees against abuse.233  The Court insists 
that individuals be aware of the circumstances under which 
surveillance may be ordered.  Further, the Court maintains that 
there be sufficient guarantees against arbitrary interference in 
order for individuals to be able to obtain a remedy either at the 
national level or before the Convention institutions.234  “The Court 
has also accepted that an individual may, under certain conditions, 
claim to be the victim of a violation occasioned by the mere 
existence of secret measures or of legislation permitting secret 
measures, without having to allege that such measures were in fact 
applied to him.”235  
In Amann v. Switzerland, the court made clear that the national 
security limitations to the right to privacy, apart from being 
foreseen in a law, must be necessary in a democratic society to 
achieve the aim of national security.236  The legal basis must be 
accessible and foreseeable.237  In Amann, the Swiss government had 
ordered surveillance measures against a citizen for law 
enforcement purposes.  The ECtHR found that Article 1 of the 
Federal Council’s Decree, that foresaw the possibility of 
conducting surveillance on behalf of the federal police in the 
interests of the Confederation’s internal and external security, 
contained no indication “as to the persons concerned by such 
measures, the circumstances in which they may be ordered, the 
means to be employed or the procedures to be observed.”238  Even 
                                                     
233  Id.   
234  Id. ¶ 68, at 15–16.  
235  Association “21 Decembre 1989” v. Romania, App. No. 33810/07, Eur. Ct. 
H.R. 27–28, ¶ 114 (2011), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int.  
236  Amann v. Switzerland, 2000-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 201, ¶ 71, at 20 (“Such 
interference breaches Article 8 unless it is ‘in accordance with the law’, pursues 
one or more of the legitimate aims referred to in paragraph 2 and, in addition, is 
‘necessary in a democratic society’ to achieve those aims.”). 
237  Id. ¶ 55, at 16 (“[T]he phrase ‘in accordance with the law’ implies 
conditions which go beyond the existence of a legal basis in domestic law and 
requires that the legal basis be ‘accessible’ and ‘foreseeable.’”). 
238  Id. ¶ 58, at 17 (holding that the legal basis did not meet the foreseeability 
requirement because it did not contain any appropriate indication as to the scope 
and conditions of exercise of the power conferred on the Public Prosecutor’s 
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if public authorities have a discretionary power in this area, a law 
must “indicate with sufficient clarity the scope and conditions” of 
the exercise of this power, in order to not violate the right to 
privacy.239   It is doubtful whether U.S. legislation allowing the 
confiscation of any “tangible thing” leading to the mass collection 
of data meets the foreseeability requirement of the law according 
to the criteria of the ECtHR. 
The ECtHR has also held that the collection and storage of 
personal information relating to telephony metadata – that is, the 
numbers dialed as well as the date and length of telephone 
conversations – and e-mail and Internet usage without a person’s 
knowledge, amounts to an interference with the right to respect for 
that person’s private life. 240   After thus collecting the different 
elements from different rulings on the topic, there can be some 
                                                     
Office to gather, record and store information.  Furthermore, they did not specify 
the conditions in which cards may be created, the procedures that have to be 
followed, the information which may be stored, or the comments which might be 
forbidden). 
239  See, e.g., id. ¶ 62, at 18 (holding that the interference with the applicant’s 
private life through intercepting his communications was not in accordance with 
the law, “since Swiss law does not indicate with sufficient clarity the scope and 
conditions of exercise of the authorities’ discretionary power in the area under 
consideration”); see also id. ¶ 80 (“[T]he creation of the impugned card by the 
Public Prosecutor’s Office and the storing of it in the Confederation’s card index 
amounted to interference with the applicant’s private life . . . .”).  Cf. E.B. v. 
Austria, App. Nos. 31913/07, 38357/07, 48098/07, 48777/07, 48779/07, Eur. Ct. 
H.R., ¶ 75 (2014), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx#{"appno":["31913/07"],"i
temid":["001-127814"]} (“[T]he storing by a public authority of information relating 
to an individual’s private life amounts to an interference within the meaning of 
Article 8, and that the protection of personal data is of fundamental importance to 
a person’s enjoyment of his or her right to respect for private and family life, as 
guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention”) (citing  Gardel v. France, App. No. 
16428/05, 2009-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 383, 402-07 (2009) (holding that, even though 
based on a judgment by a court that was delivered to the public, the sensitive 
nature of the information contained in a criminal record and the impact it may 
have on the individual concerned relates to that person’s private life and amounts 
to interference).  
240  See Copland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 62617/00, 2007-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 
317, 329, ¶ 43 (2007)  (noting that even nominal data, such as the date and length 
of a phone call and the phone numbers dialed, may be protected by the right to 
privacy because they constitute an “’integral element of the communications 
made by telephone’ . . . [and that t]he mere fact that these data may have been 
legitimately obtained” by a third party “in the form of telephone bills, is no bar to 
finding an interference with rights guaranteed under Article 8.”) (citations 
omitted); see also id. ¶ 48, at 330 (holding that that there was no legal basis 
regulating monitoring of an employee’s telephone, email, or Internet usage at the 
place of work). 
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optimism that the Court would apply the principle of 
proportionality in a way as to limit data collection from 
surveillance authorities.  The Court has already fast-tracked a case 
brought by privacy and human rights advocates against Britain 
ordering Ministers to justify Government Communication 
Headquarters’ mass surveillance programs.241  An applicant before 
the ECtHR does not need to be a national of one of the member 
states, a policy that is in line with the Court’s role as promulgating 
human rights in general. 
 
3.4.  Cloud Computing and the Safe Harbor 
 
When the FISA Amendments Act was introduced in July 2008, 
it introduced “remote computing services,” widening the scope to 
include cloud computing.242  Cloud computing can be defined as 
the distributed processing of data on remotely located computers 
accessed through the Internet.243  Since information stored in the 
cloud is stored in a physical machine owned by a company or 
person in a specific country, it may be subject to the laws of the 
country where the physical machine is located.244  As it may be 
difficult though for an individual data subject to determine the 
location of data storage in the online context,245 cloud providers are 
                                                     
241   Nick Hopkins, Justify GCHQ Mass Surveillance, European Court Tells 
Ministers, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 23, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/uk-
news/2014/jan/24/justify-gchq-mass-surveillance-european-court-human-
rights?CMP=ema_follow (“[T]he court in Strasbourg has told the government to 
provide submissions by the beginning of May about whether GCHQ’s spying 
activities could be a violation of the right to privacy under article 8 of the 
European convention.”). 
242  The government can compel third party providers to disclose 
communications content in RCS storage with an 18 U.S.C. § 27803(c) order.  For 
further discussion of Remote Computing Services under the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act, see Pell, supra note 221, at 249.  
      243     See generally CHRISTOPHER KUNER, TRANSBORDER DATA FLOWS AND DATA 
PRIVACY LAW 121 (2013). 
244  Robert Gellman, Privacy in the Clouds: Risks to Privacy and Confidentiality 
from Cloud Computing, WORLD PRIVACY FORUM (Feb. 23, 2009), at 7 (noting that the 
physical location of information in the cloud may determine the legal rules that 
apply); see also KUNER, supra note 243. 
245  The difficulties may arise due to the reluctance of the data controller to 
disclose such information based on concerns about data security, the fact that the 
controller has poor informational policies, and the number of parties involved in 
the processing, which complicates a determination about who is processing 
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considered transnational companies subject to conflicts of public 
international law.  As a Note by Policy Department C of the 
European Parliament explains, “[w]hich law they choose to obey 
will be governed by the penalties applicable and exigencies of the 
situation, and in practice the predominant allegiances of the 
company management.” 246   As a cloud is made up of shared 
systems and infrastructures, cloud providers process personal data 
emanating from a wide range of sources in terms of data subjects 
and organizations, allowing for the possibility that conflicting 
interests might arise.  Moreover, the outsourcing of concrete 
services and chain processing involving multiple processors and 
subcontractors may complicate matters even further.247  The cloud 
client is rarely able to know where the data are located or stored or 
transferred as they can move around all over the world.248 
Cloud providers cannot fulfill any of the privacy principles on  
which Safe Harbor is founded as this was not resolved 
satisfactorily by the Commission:  although U.S. cloud providers 
advertise Safe Harbor certifications, the Article 29 Data Protection 
Working Party has clarified that existing protection is not 
enough.249  Cloud clients are also exposed to the dangers of sub-
processing by third parties since cloud providers usually do not 
offer them such information.250  Further: 
                                                     
particular data at a particular time.  It can also be unclear which location should 
control the applicable law and jurisdiction – the location of the business 
establishment of the data controller, or the location of the data.  See id. at 122. 
246  Bowden, supra note 20, at 22 (citation omitted).  
247  Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 05/2012 on Cloud 
Computing, EUR. COMM’N (July 1, 2012), at 5 [hereinafter Article 29 Working Party 
Opinion 5/2012], http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-
29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2012/wp196_en.pdf 
(indicating the potential absence of client control when data is handled by a cloud 
provider and outlining the risks associated with that absence of control).  See 
Article 29 Working Party Opinion 4/2000, supra note 77. 
248  Article 29 Working Party Opinion 5/2012, supra note 247, at 17 (“The 
cloud client is therefore rarely in a position to be able to know in real time where 
the data are located or stored or transferred.”).  
249  Id. (“[S]elf-certification with Safe Harbor may not be deemed sufficient in 
the absence of robust enforcement of data protection principles”); see also Bowden 
supra note 20, at 22 (“[T]he EU is not addressing properly an irrevocable loss of 
data sovereignty, and allowing errors made during the Safe Harbor negotiations 
of 2000 to be consolidated, not corrected.”) (citation omitted).  
250  Article 29 Working Party Opinion 5/2012, supra note 247, at 17–18 
(suggesting that national legislation should require that the terms regarding sub-
processors, including their location and other data, be identified in the contract 
between the cloud client and the cloud provider).  
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  Safe Harbor principles by themselves may also not 
guarantee the data exporter the necessary means to ensure 
that appropriate security measures have been applied by 
the cloud provider in the US, as may be required by 
national legislations based on the Directive 95/46/EC . . . .  
In terms of data security, cloud computing raises several 
cloud-specific security risks, such as loss of governance, 
insecure or incomplete data deletion, insufficient audit 
trails or isolation failures, which are not sufficiently 
addressed by the existing Safe Harbor principles on data 
security.251   
 
The existing EU directive and the proposed Regulation outline 
their territorial scope as covering “the processing of personal data 
in the context of the activities of an establishment of a controller or 
a processor in the Union, whether the processing takes place in the 
Union or not.”252  The proposed regulation defines its territorial 
scope as applying to non-EU companies that provide services 
through the cloud, as it applies to “the processing of personal data 
of [EU] data subjects residing in the Union by a controller not 
established in the Union, where the processing activities are related 
to:  (a) the offering of goods or services to such data subjects in the 
Union; or (b) the monitoring of their behavior.”253  Moreover, the 
proposed privacy law is overbroad.  The proposed regulation 
associates monitoring the behavior of data subjects with the 
processing techniques of profiling.  However, there are many 
innocuous activities that require the monitoring of data.  For 
instance, many cloud services track an individual’s data merely to 
                                                     
251  Id. at 18.  Standard contractual clauses or binding corporate rules can also 
be mediums of assuring protection on cross border data transfers.  The Article 29 
Working Party has underlined the need to make sure that processors who sub-
contract services out to sub-processors make this information available to the 
client.  This can be accomplished by detailing the type of service subcontracted, by 
describing the characteristics of the current or potential sub-contractor, and by 
setting out the obligations and responsibilities required by data protection 
legislation in order to ensure effective control over and allocate clear 
responsibility for processing activities.  Id. at 9. 
252  LIBE Committee Vote, supra note 162, at 6 (backing reform after an 
overwhelming EU vote in favor of the proposals).  
253  Id.;  Proposed Regulation, supra note 3, at 41 (adopting the proposal 
including Article 3, § 2).  
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provide the individual with additional storage capacity.  Because 
the regulation fails to distinguish between these activities from real 
profiling, it will prevent consumers from realizing many benefits 
of networked intelligence.254  This is another reason the existing 
Safe Harbor agreement is insufficient.255 
A Working Party Opinion underlines the importance of adding 
an additional restriction to the proposed regulation.  Controllers 
operating in the EU “must be prohibited from disclosing personal 
data to a third country if so requested by a third country’s judicial 
or administrative authority, unless this is expressly authorized by 
an international agreement or provided for by mutual legal 
assistance treaties or approved by a supervisory authority.”256  A 
comprehensive international treaty is necessary to guarantee full 
reciprocity of rights and to grant EU citizens equal protection to 
U.S. citizens in U.S. courts.257  The European Parliament should 
consider amending the Data Protection Regulation to require 
prominent warnings to individual data subjects of vulnerability to 
political surveillance before EU Cloud data is exported to U.S. 
jurisdiction.258   European companies are using cloud-computing 
services in the U.S. for the purposes of data storage.  The company 
offering the storage must subscribe to the Safe Harbor Principles 
that are alternatives to a specific contractual arrangement between 
the two companies regarding the treatment of personal data 
                                                     
254  See Paul M. Schwartz, Information Privacy in the Cloud, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 
1623, 1644 (2013) (noting that equating monitoring with profiling creates 
impediments to the legitimate use of networked intelligence).  Likewise, the EU’s 
broad interpretation of ‘automated processing’ creates concern that the regulation 
would threaten “socially productive uses of analytics.”  Id. at 1647.  At the same 
time, it can operate protectively against state surveillance by limiting the amount 
of information that private actors can withhold.  
       255   Id. 
256 Article 29 Working Party Opinion 05/2012, supra note 247, at 23 (“[I]t is of 
the utmost importance to add to the future Regulation that controllers operating 
in the EU must be prohibited from disclosing personal data to a third country if so 
requested by a third country’s judicial or administrative authority, unless this is 
expressly authorized by an international agreement or provided for by mutual 
legal assistance treaties or approved by a supervisory authority.”).  The opinion 
went on to state that Regulation (EC) NO 2271/96 demonstrates an example of 
legal ground for this proposition.  The working party further stresses the need for 
the Regulation to include the obligatory use of Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties 
in case of disclosures not authorized by Union or Member States law.  
257  Bowden, supra note 20, at 22 (“The primary desideratum would be a 
comprehensive international treaty guaranteeing full reciprocity of rights . . . .”). 
258  Id. 
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transferred to the U.S.259  Since the protection offered by the Safe 
Harbor is not sufficient in reference to the national security 
exception and unless the U.S. adheres to the Council of Europe 
Convention 108, a special treaty is required which will extend the 
protection that U.S. nationals enjoy to non-nationals. 
Furthermore, the existing Directive and the Proposed 
Regulation impose limitations on contractual freedom that conflict 
with the U.S. Terms of Service or take-it-or-leave-it contracts for 
cloud computing.  EU law limits contracting out of the protection 
afforded by it, whereas the standardized offers of many cloud-
computing services may impose contracting out of privacy 
protection. 260   In the U.S., some state laws regulate cloud 
computing by imposing obligations concerning data security, data 
breach security notification, and data disposal.261  These differences 
and the insufficiency of the Safe Harbor principles necessitate an 
ad-hoc convention with the aim of elaborating model contractual 
clauses concerning the guarantees of the use of information stored 
in the cloud, which can also indirectly limit the amount of data that 
ends in the hands of public authorities for intelligence purposes.262   
A Working Party Opinion has elaborated requirements for the 
minimum content of contractual safeguards of the “controller—
processor” relationships.  Among those are the specification of 
security measures that the cloud provider must comply with, 
depending on the risks represented by the processing and the 
                                                     
259  E.g., Orange France is using the cloud computing services of Amazon U.S. 
for data storage, which means that Amazon must subscribe to the Safe Harbor 
Principles.  A global company such as Mastercard – based in the U.S. and having a 
large number of clients in the EU – obtains the flexibility it needs for operations by 
subscribing to the Safe Harbor Principles while, at the same time, permitting the 
free flow of data outside of the EU, subject to the respect of the Safe Harbor 
Principles.  See European Commission Memo, supra note 13, at 5.   
260  See Article 29 Working Party Opinion 05/2012, supra note 247, at 8 
(discussing the imbalance of negotiating power with respect to contract terms 
between the large service providers and the relatively small controller). 
261  Schwartz, supra note 254, at 1659–60 (contrasting the broad ‘regulatory 
thicket’ approach to data privacy in the EU with the U.S. approach, which has 
relied more on contractual agreements and state-by-state regulation).  California, 
for example, has created a requirement of reasonable security when personal data 
are processed.  Applicable federal statutes in the healthcare and financial service 
sectors provide more specific rules regarding the safeguards that must be in place 
when personal information is processed, including when it is processed in the 
cloud.  Id. at 1660.  
262  Cf. Schwartz, supra note 254, at 1659 (proposing that developing model 
contractual clauses for cloud-client relationships would help the EU streamline 
the regulatory process).  
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nature of the data, the subject and time frame of the cloud service, 
the extent, manner, and purpose of the processing, and the 
specification of the conditions for returning the data or destroying 
them once the service is concluded.263  Additional elements should 
include confidentiality clauses or an express statement that the 
cloud provider may not communicate the data to third parties, 
unless they are subcontractors.264  The cloud provider is obligated 
to provide a list of locations where the data may be processed and 
to notify the cloud client about any legally binding request for 
disclosure of the personal data by law enforcement unless 
otherwise prohibited.  There is also a general obligation to give 
assurance that its internal organization and data processing 
arrangements are compliant with the applicable national and 
international legal requirements and standards.265  
 
3.5.  Does the Collection Meet the Requirements of the ICCPR? 
 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
protects privacy in Article 17. 266   According to the 
recommendations of the special rapporteur, limitations to the right 
                                                     
263  See generally Article 29 Working Party Opinion 5/2012, supra note 247.  
264  Id. at 13.  
265  Id. at 13–14.  They must also inform clients about all subcontractors 
contributing to the provision of the respective cloud service and all locations in 
which data may be processed by the cloud provider and/or its subcontractors.  Id. 
at 20.  The Committee of Experts Commissioned by the U.S. President to issue 
proposals for a better protection recommends regarding encryption as a measure 
to increase security and user confidence.  The Committee also advises that the U.S. 
government should fully support and not undermine efforts to create encryption 
standards, and not in any way subvert, undermine, weaken, or make vulnerable 
generally available commercial software.  The Committee urges the U.S. 
government and U.S. companies to increase the use of encryption, in order to 
better protect data in transit, at rest, in the cloud, and in other storage.  LIBERTY 
REPORT, supra note 93, at 216.  The U.S. government thus should make it clear that 
the NSA will not engineer vulnerabilities into the encryption algorithms that 
guard global commerce, that it will not demand changes in any product by any 
vendor for the purpose of undermining the security or integrity of the product, or 
to ease NSA’s clandestine collection of information by users of the product, and 
that it will not hold encrypted communication as a way to avoid retention limits.  
The United States should not provide competitive advantage to U.S. firms by the 
provision to those corporations of industrial espionage, and similarly it should 
commit to international norms on the issue. 
       266    See generally International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967), S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-20, art. 17.  
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to privacy should pass the “permissible limitations test” foreseen 
in Articles 21 and 22 of the same Covenant for the limitation of 
freedom of assembly and freedom of association.267  According to 
this test, “(a) restrictions must be prescribed by national law; (b) 
they must be necessary in a democratic society; and (c) they must 
serve one of the legitimate aims enumerated in each of the 
provisions that contain a limitations clause.”268  The Human Rights 
Committee has also set a permissible limitations test for the right to 
privacy.269  These requirements mean that the essence of a human 
right is not subject to restrictions, any restrictions must be 
necessary for reaching the legitimate aim, and they must conform 
to the principle of proportionality. 270   States may make use of 
targeted surveillance measures, provided that it is case-specific 
interference, on the basis of a warrant issued by a judge on 
showing of probable cause or reasonable grounds. 271   Put 
differently, “[t]here must be some factual basis, related to the 
behavior of an individual, which justifies the suspicion that he or 
she may be engaged in preparing a terrorist attack.” 272   The 
principle of proportionality does not seem to be met by the 
massive collection of data by the U.S. authorities for a number of 
reasons. 
First, there is no explicit obligation to minimize impact on non-
U.S. persons outside the U.S.273   According to a FISC opinion, 
measures previously proposed by the government to comply with 
this requirement have been found to be unsatisfactory in relation to 
“upstream” collection and processing.274  New measures were only 
found to be satisfactory for the protection of U.S. persons. 275  
                                                     
       267    Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, at 8, Human Rights 
Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/13/37 (Dec. 28, 2009) (by Martin Scheinin) 
[hereinafter Special Rapporteur on Human Rights]. 
       268    Id.  
269  Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 27: Freedom of 
Movement (Article 12), U.N. GAOR, 67th Sess., 1783rd mtg. at 4, U.N. Doc 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9 (Nov. 1, 1999).  
       270    Id.  
       271    Special Rapporteur on Human Rights, supra note 267, at 9. 
       272     Id.  
       273     50 U.S.C. § 1801(h) (1978) (foreseeing minimization procedures for U.S. 
persons only).  
274  FISC Oct. 3, 2011 Opinion, supra note 129, at 49.  
275  Id. at 65. 
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Furthermore, the FISC review does not include review of potential 
measures to protect the personal information of non-U.S. persons 
outside the U.S.276  “’[U]nreviewed data[,]’ collected under Section 
702, is generally retained for five years, although data collected via 
upstream collection is retained for two years.”277  The U.S. stated 
that in fifty-four instances, collection under Sections 702 and 215 
contributed to the prevention and combating of terrorism; twenty-
five of those instances involved EU Member States.278 
Furthermore, the technical impossibility to distinguish the 
relevant communications from the non-relevant in many of the 
NSA programs justifies the massive collection of data that does not 
serve national security purposes.  As the FISA Court noted in 
multi-communication transactions (“MCTs”), “NSA acquires not 
only the discrete communication that references the tasked 
selector, but also in many cases the contents of other discrete 
communications that do not reference the tasked selector and to 
which no target is a party.”279  The sole reason these non-target 
communications are collected is because they contain “’a tasked 
selector used by a person who has been subjected to NSA’s 
targeting procedures.’” 280   Moreover, upon acquisition, “NSA’s 
upstream collection devices often lack the capability to determine 
whether a transaction contains a single communication or multiple 
communications, or to identify the parties to any particular 
communication within a transaction.”281  
The Court found that the upstream collection acquires tens of 
thousands of discrete communications of non-target United States 
persons and persons in the United States, protected by the Fourth 
Amendment, “by virtue of the fact that their communications are 
included in MCTs selected for acquisition by NSA’s upstream 
                                                     
276  AD HOC EU-U.S. WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 138, at 11. 
277  Id.  These retention periods apply to all unreviewed data, including both 
U.S. and non-U.S. person information. 
278  The U.S. was unable to provide figures regarding Executive Order 12333. 
The U.S. confirmed that out of the total of fifty-four cases, forty-two cases 
concerned plots that were foiled or disrupted, and twelve cases concerned 
material support for terrorism cases.  Id. at 12.  
279  FISC Oct. 3, 2011 Opinion, supra note 129, at 42–43.  “By acquiring such 
MCTs, NSA likely acquires tens of thousands of additional communications of 
non-targets each year, many of whom have no relationship whatsoever with the 
user of the tasked selector.”  Id. at 43.  
280  Id.  
281  Id. 
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collection devices.” 282   This means that communications were 
collected concerning persons who are non-targets, located inside 
the U.S. and for whom there is no reason to believe that all of their 
discrete communication will be to, from, or about the targeted 
selector.  Additionally, if the person is in the U.S., the Court 
presumes that the majority of that person’s communication will be 
with other persons in the U.S., many of whom will be U.S. 
persons.283  NSA acquires at least 1.3 million MCTs each year of 
non-targets located outside the United States whose 
communications will presumably be mostly with persons outside 
the U.S., most of whom are non-U.S. persons.284  It also acquires 
97,000–140,000 MCTs each year concerning persons whose identity 
or location cannot be identified.285  This unknown category adds 
substantially to the number of non-target communications of or 
concerning United States persons or that are to or from persons in 
the United States being acquired by NSA each year.286  For the 
same Court, “NSA’s collection of MCTs results in the acquisition of 
a very large number of Fourth Amendment-protected 
communications that . . . do not serve the national security needs 
underlying the Section 702 collection . . . .”287  The U.S. President 
committed to applying restrictions on the use of information 
incidentally collected from communications between foreign 
citizens and U.S. citizens under Section 702.288 
In addition, there are doubts as to whether the telephony 
metadata program provides information that cannot be provided 
through more conventional investigative techniques.  A Federal 
                                                     
282  Id. at 37.  
283  Id. at 38. 
284  FISC Oct. 3, 2011 Opinion, supra note 129, at 39–40 (discussing that “even 
if only 1% of these MCTs contain a single non-target communication of or 
concerning a United States person, or that is to or from a person in the United 
States, NSA would be acquiring in excess of 10,000 additional discrete 
communications each year that are of or concerning United States persons, or that 
are to or from a person in the United States.”).  
285  Id. at 40.  
286  Id. at 41.  
287  Id. at 78. 
288  Barack Obama, President of the United States, Speech on NSA Reform 
(Jan. 17, 2014) (transcript available at Transcript of President Obama’s Jan. 17 Speech 
on NSA Reforms, WASH. POST (Jan. 17, 2014) [hereinafter Obama Speech], 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/full-text-of-president-obamas-jan-17-
speech-on-nsa-reforms/2014/01/17/fa33590a-7f8c-11e3-9556-
4a4bf7bcbd84_story.html.  
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district court examining a preliminary injunction found that there 
is significant likelihood that the program constitutes an 
“unreasonable search” under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution, as the Government did not “cite a single instance in 
which analysis of the NSA’s bulk metadata collection actually 
stopped an imminent attack, or otherwise aided the Government in 
achieving any objective that was time-sensitive in nature.”289 
                                                     
289  Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 40 (D.D.C. 2013).  For the court, 
none of the three episodes cited by the government that supposedly illustrate the 
role that telephony metadata analysis can play in preventing and protecting 
against terrorist attack involved any apparent urgency.  In the first case, the 
metadata did not reveal any new information that had not already come to light 
in the investigation up to that point; in the second, the metadata analysis was 
used only after the terrorist was arrested “to establish [his] foreign ties and put 
them in context with his U.S. based planning efforts[;]” in the third, the metadata 
analysis “revealed a previously unknown number for [a] co-conspirator. . . and 
corroborated his connection to [the target of the investigation] as well as to other 
U.S.-based extremists.”  Id. (internal quotations omitted).  The court cites Assistant 
Director Holley of the FBI who concedes that bulk metadata analysis only 
“sometimes provides information earlier than the FBI’s other investigative methods 
and techniques.” Id. (internal quotations omitted); contra ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. 
Supp. 2d 724, 727 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (holding that relevance to an authorized 
investigation under section 215 is to be defined broadly as concerning tangible 
items which “bear on or could reasonably lead to other matter that could bear on 
the investigation.”).  For the court, since “there is no way for the Government to 
know which particle of telephony metadata will lead to useful counterterrorism 
information[,] . . . courts routinely authorize large-scale collections of information, 
even if most of it will not directly bear on the investigation.”  Id. at 747.  For the 
court, “aggregated telephony metadata is relevant because it allows the querying 
technique to be comprehensive. And NSA’s warehousing of that data allows a 
query to be instantaneous.”  Id. at 748 (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 
(1979), as controlling precedent which held that an individual has no legitimate 
expectation of privacy in information provided to third parties; the judge held 
that  the program is legal).  First, according to the judge, NSA needs to collect bulk 
telephony metadata to be able to query the telephony metadata database.  
“Second, when it makes a query, it only learns the telephony metadata of the 
telephone numbers within three ‘hops’ of the ‘seed.’  Third, without resort to 
additional techniques, the Government does not know who any of the telephone 
numbers belong to. . . .  [It only sees] that telephone number A called telephone 
number B.”  Id. at 750–51.  For the judge, “the Government’s subsequent querying 
of the telephony metadata does not implicate the Fourth Amendment – any more 
than a law enforcement officer’s query of the FBI’s fingerprint or DNA databases 
to identify someone.”  Id. at 751 (citing Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1963–64 
(2013)).  For the court, “there is no evidence that the Government has used any of 
the bulk telephony metadata it collected for any purpose other than investigating 
and disrupting terrorist attacks.  While there have been unintentional violations of 
guidelines, those appear to stem from human error and the incredibly complex 
computer programs that support this vital tool.  And once detected, those 
violations were self-reported and stopped.”  Id. at 757.  In a recent report of the 
New America Foundation on the effectiveness of the NSA Bulk Surveillance 
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Similarly, the Committee of Experts commissioned by the 
President found that the information contributed to terrorist 
investigations by the use of Section 215 telephony metadata was 
not essential to preventing attacks and could readily have been 
obtained in a timely manner using conventional Section 215 
orders.290   The Committee expressed caution as to whether the 
program is “efficacious in alleviating concern about possible 
terrorist connections, given the fact that the meta-data captured by 
the program covers only a portion of the records of only a few 
telephone service providers.”291  The Committee noted also that the 
bulk telephony metadata collection program has experienced 
several significant compliance issues, as the FISC found that for 
two and a half years the NSA had searched all incoming phone 
metadata using an “alert list” of phone numbers of possible 
terrorists that had been created for other purposes, as almost 90 
percent of the numbers on the alert list did not meet the 
“reasonable, articulable, suspicion” standard. 292   The FISC 
concluded that the minimization procedures had been “’so 
frequently and systematically violated that it can fairly be said that 
this critical element of the overall . . . regime has never functioned 
effectively’” due to misunderstandings on the part of analysts 
about the precise rules governing their use of the metadata.293  
                                                     
Programs, this opinion was criticized as exhibiting substantial deference to the 
government’s broad claims regarding its use of bulk collection under Section 215 
and little examination of the particular cases beyond the government’s statements.  
See Peter Bergen et al., Do NSA’s Bulk Surveillance Programs Stop Terrorists?, NEW 
AM. FOUND. (Jan. 2014), available at 
http://www.newamerica.net/publications/policy/do_nsas_bulk_surveillance_p
rograms_stop_terrorists (noting that the role of the NSA in the cases of 
individuals charged with some kind of terrorism crime was “limited and 
insufficient to generate evidence of criminal wrongdoing without the use of 
traditional investigative tools.”).  The Report concludes that “the overall problem 
for U.S. counterterrorism officials is not that they need vaster amounts of 
information from the bulk surveillance programs, but that they don’t sufficiently 
understand or widely share the information they already possess that was derived 
from conventional law enforcement and intelligence techniques.”  Id. at 3.  
290  LIBERTY REPORT, supra note 93, at 104.  
291  Id.  The section 215 telephony metadata program has made only a modest 
contribution to the nation’s security having generated relevant information in 
only a small number of cases, while there has been no instance in which NSA 
could say with confidence that the outcome would have been different without 
the section 215 telephony metadata program.  
292  In re Production of Tangible Things from [redacted], No. BR 08-13 (FISC 
Mar. 2, 2009).  
 293    Id. at 105. 
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According to the findings of the District Court for the District of 
Columbia294 and the Committee, the program does not seem to 
meet the standards of the ICCPR.295  
The Committee stresses that the government must end the 
storage of bulk telephony under Section 215 and that it must 
transition to a system in which the metadata are held either by 
private providers or by a private third party.  These private data 
holders should only allow access to their archives only when the 
FISC authorizes a Section 215 order that meets the requirements 
described above.  The court should require reasonable grounds to 
believe that the information sought is relevant to an authorized 
investigation protecting “’against international terrorism or 
clandestine intelligence activities’” and ensure “the order is 
reasonable in focus, scope and breadth.” 296   This approach is 
similar to the one followed by the EU in its data retention 
directive. 297   Legislation might require relevant telephone 
providers to retain the data for a specified period of time, though 
no longer than two years, to ensure that it will be available if and 
when the government needs to query it.298 
                                                     
294  See generally Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013); LIBERTY 
REPORT, supra note 93, at 105 (quoting FISC Judge Reggie Walton in his opinion 
from Klayman v. Obama).   
295  The same committee recommended that the statutes that authorize the 
issuance of National Security Letters be amended to permit their issuance only 
upon a showing that: “(1) the government has reasonable grounds to believe that 
the particular information sought is relevant to an authorized investigation  
intended to protect ‘against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence 
activities’ and (2) like a subpoena, the order is reasonable in focus, scope and 
breadth.”  LIBERTY REPORT, supra note 93, at 24.  The committee also recommends 
“that all statutes authorizing the use of National Security Letters should be 
amended to require the use of the same oversight, minimization, retention, and 
dissemination standards that currently govern the use of section 215 orders.”  Id. 
at 25.  NSLs should not be issued by the FBI itself, but by a court, which would 
mean “a significant expansion in the number of FISC judges, the creation within 
the FISC of several federal magistrate judges to handle NSL requests, and use of 
the Classified Information Procedures Act to enable other federal courts to issue 
NSLs.”  LIBERTY REPORT, supra note 93, at 93 (internal citation omitted).   
296  LIBERTY REPORT, supra note 93, at 24.  In a line of thinking where private 
actors are more trusted by the government, the Committee notes that “the 
government can query the information directly from the relevant service 
providers after obtaining an order from the FISC,” as originally envisioned when 
section 215 was enacted, a change that would greatly reduce the intake of 
telephony metadata by NSA and would reduce the risk of government abuse.  Id. 
at 118. 
297  See supra Part 3.2. 
298  In that case, the government should reimburse the providers for the cost 
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The President did not accept this proposal, and determined 
that for reasons of accountability, it would be preferable for the 
federal government to collect this data. 299   The President 
committed to modifying the program in querying phone calls only 
two steps (or “hops”) removed from a telephone number linked to 
a terrorist network, instead of the current three steps removed 
standard.300  He also committed to querying the database only after 
“a judicial finding or in case of a true emergency.”301  The reason 
put forward for the mass collection of telephone metadata is to 
protect the information that might be useful at some point.  The 
difficulties in querying the material collected raise concerns as to 
whether this insurance-style purpose meets the standard of 
proportionality.  If according to the recent reports, the material 
provides only small parts of information, which also can be 
obtained by the use of conventional investigative techniques, and 
thanks to a better cooperation between the CIA and the FBI,302 then 
the principle of proportionality does not appear to be met. 
In general, there are doubts as to whether governments, unlike 
                                                     
of retaining the data.  An FCC regulation already requires providers to hold such 
information for 18 months, so it seems feasible to change the retention period for 
telephone records.  See LIBERTY REPORT, supra note 93, at 119; see also 47 C.F.R. § 
42.6 (1986) (laying out rules for the retention of telephone toll records: ”Each 
carrier that offers or bills toll telephone service shall retain for a period of 18 
months such records as are necessary to provide the following billing information 
about telephone toll calls: the name, address, and telephone number of the caller, 
telephone number called, date, time and length of the call.  Each carrier shall 
retain this information for toll calls that it bills whether it is billing its own toll 
service customers for toll calls or billing customers for another carrier.”).  
299  See Obama Speech, supra note 288 (noting “any third party maintaining a 
single, consolidated database would be carrying out what is essentially a 
government function but with more expense, more legal ambiguity, potentially 
less accountability – all of which would have a doubtful impact on increasing 
public confidence that their privacy is being protected.”); see also Senator Dianne 
Feinstein, Remarks at a Hearing on President’s Review Group on Intelligence and 
Communications Technologies Before the Judiciary Committee (Jan. 14, 2014),  
(transcript available at http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/01-14-
14FeinsteinStatement.pdf) (highlighting Senator Feinstein’s belief that, in the 
interest of timeliness, the state must be able to query the data at any time). 
300  See Obama Speech, supra note 288. 
301  Id.  
302  See Bergen, supra note 289, at 7 (calling attention to “’serious doubts about 
the efficacy of the metadata collection program as a means of conducting time-
sensitive investigations in cases involving imminent threats of terrorism.’”) 
(quoting U.S. District Judge Richard Leon in his opinion from Klayman v. 
Obama); Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013).   
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marketers, are able to conduct data mining in a way that might be 
useful in actually serving the purpose of identifying terrorists.303 
Data mining “occurs without legal guarantees for the accuracy or 
appropriateness of the data or the searches, redress for people 
injured by being falsely identified as posing a threat, or judicial or 
legislative oversight.”304  The President addressed neither the issue 
of massive data collection nor the NSA’s attempts to weaken 
encryption technologies. 
In May 2014, the House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence approved a compromise bill on NSA reforms that was 
unanimously approved by the House Judiciary Committee.305  The 
bill was passed in the House of Representatives on May 22, 2014.306  
It was, however, defeated in the Senate on November 18, 2014.307  
The bill would ban the bulk collection of all types of records, not 
just the Section 215 phone metadata program.  It would prohibit 
other types of bulk collection by requiring that any records 
obtained be linked to a specific person, account, or entity.308  The 
bulk records would stay in the hands of phone companies, which 
would not be required to retain them for any longer than they 
normally would. 309   The government would be able to obtain 
                                                     
303  Levinson-Waldman, supra note 31, at 3 (noting that although marketers 
can use data mining to predict purchasing practices of customers, researchers 
have demonstrated persuasively that it is impossible and unlikely ever to become 
possible, to predict whether a person will take part in a terrorist act); see also Jeff 
Jonas & Jim Harper, Effective Counterterrorism and the Limited Role of Predictive Data 
Mining, POL’Y ANALYSIS (Dec. 11, 2006), at 3 (arguing “the possible benefits of 
predictive data mining for finding planning or preparation for terrorism are 
minimal.  The financial costs, wasted effort, and threats to privacy and civil 
liberties are potentially vast.  Those costs outstrip any conceivable benefits of 
using predictive data mining for this purpose.”).  
304  Fred H. Cate, Government Data Mining: The Need for a Legal Framework, 43 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 435, 436 (2008). 
305  House Intelligence Committee Approves NSA Reforms, BRENNAN CTR. FOR 
JUSTICE (May 8, 2014) [hereinafter Brennan Center for Justice Report], available at 
http://www.brennancenter.org/press-release/house-intelligence-committee-
approves-nsa-reforms.   
306  Jonathan Weisman & Charlie Savage, House Passes Restraints on Bulk Data 
Collection, N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/23/us/politics/house-votes-to-limit-nsas-
collection-of-phone-data.html?_r=0.  
      307    Charlie Savage & Jeremy W. Peters, Bill to Restrict N.S.A. Collection Blocked 
in Vote by Senate Republicans, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2014), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/19/us/nsa-phone-records.html.  
308  See Brennan Center for Justice Report, supra note 305. 
309  Charlie Savage, Obama to Call for End to N.S.A.’s Bulk Data Collection, N.Y. 
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access to the records through a FISA court order to individuals’ 
phone records up to two “hops.” 310   The bill would not end 
searches in which the government collects the content of phone 
and email communications of foreigners overseas without a 
warrant, and then searches them for communications to, from, or 
about Americans. 311   The compromise bill omitted key 
transparency provisions, including government reporting 
requirements and a provision for a special advocate to argue the 
other side in significant cases before the secret FISA Court.312   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
As the Committee of Experts commissioned by the President 
notes, there are special historical reasons for which FISA protects 
U.S. persons more strictly. The bill’s authors were particularly 
concerned by the fact that at the time the law was enacted U.S. 
citizens were the object of government surveillance in the U.S.313  
The Committee cites a number of pragmatic reasons in support of 
the need to increase protection for non-U.S. persons, among which 
are the duty of reciprocity requiring that the U.S. treat other 
citizens well if it wants its own citizens to be treated well by other 
governments. 314   Second, aggressive surveillance policies under 
Section 702 might trigger economic repercussions for American 
businesses, potentially causing them to lose market shares due to 
growing distrust of their capacity to guarantee the privacy of their 
international users.315  Unrestrained American surveillance of non-
                                                     
TIMES (Mar. 24, 2014), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/25/us/obama-to-seek-nsa-curb-on-call-
data.html?_r=0.  
310  See Brennan Center for Justice Report, supra note 305.  
       311    Id.; see also The Editorial Board, A Stronger Bill to Limit Surveillance, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 27, 2014), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/28/opinion/a-stronger-bill-to-limit-
surveillance.html. 
       312    Brennan Center for Justice Report, supra note 305.   
313  LIBERTY REPORT, supra note 93, at 154. 
314  Id. at 155.  
315  Id. at 155 (U.S. researchers estimate that as consequence of mistrust 
caused by NSA program, $180 billion or 25% of U.S. overseas information 
technology services risk to be lost by 2016); see also Allan Holmes, NSA Spying 
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United States persons might alienate other nations, fracture the 
unity of the Internet, and undermine the free flow of information 
across national boundaries. 
The EU, on the other hand, insists on the need to use the formal 
channels negotiated between itself and the U.S., such as the Mutual 
Legal Assistance agreement, in order to augment the exchange of 
data for the prevention and investigation of criminal activities.316  
A U.S.-EU Mutual Legal Assistance agreement has been in place 
since 2003, which facilitates and accelerates assistance in criminal 
matters between the EU and the U.S., including through the 
exchange of personal information.317 
The EU and the U.S. are currently negotiating a new 
framework agreement on data protection in the field of police and 
judicial cooperation.318  The EU authorities aim to ensure a high 
level of data protection, in line with the EU data protection acquis 
for citizens whose data is transferred across the Atlantic, thus 
strengthening EU-U.S. cooperation in the fight against crime and 
terrorism.319  Under U.S. law, Europeans who are not U.S. residents 
do not benefit from the safeguards of the 1974 U.S. Privacy Act, 
which limits judicial redress to U.S. citizens and legal permanent 
residents.  The Commission is requesting that EU citizens who are 
not U.S. residents must be given enforceable rights, notably the 
                                                     
Seen Risking Billions in U.S. Technology Sales, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 10, 2013, 11:33 AM), 
available at 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-10/nsa-spying-seen-risking-billions-
in-u-s-technology-sales.html (finding that after a report surfaced that the NSA 
built “backdoors” in technology security products sold overseas, U.S. technology 
companies could see overseas sales drop by as much as $180 billion). 
316  See Letter of Viviane Reding, Vice President, Eur. Comm’n, to Eric H. 
Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen. of the U.S. Dep’t of Justice (June 10, 2013), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/files/report-findings-of-the-ad-hoc-
eu-us-working-group-on-data-protection.pdf (pointing out to Attorney General 
Holder that the Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement “should be used to the 
greatest possible extent”).  
317  Agreement on Mutual Legal Assistance Between the European Union and 
the United States of America, 2003 O.J. (L 181) 34, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2003:181:0034:0042:en:PDF.  
318  Communication on the Functioning of the Safe Harbour, supra note 55, at 8. 
319  See Memorandum from the Eur. Comm’n, Joint Press Statement 
Following the EU-US-Justice and Home Affairs Ministerial Meeting of 18 
November 2013 in Washington (Nov. 18, 2013) (during which the EU and the U.S. 
committed to complete the negotiations on the agreement ahead of summer 2014).  
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right to judicial redress, and there seems to be willingness to 
converge on this issue.320  The Commission also aims to narrowly 
define the derogation based on national security.  This “umbrella 
agreement” on the general framework needed to ensure a high 
level of protection of personal data when transferred to the U.S. for 
the purpose of preventing or combating crime and terrorism, will 
not provide the legal basis for any specific transfers of personal 
data between the EU and the U.S.  A specific legal basis for such 
data transfers would always be required, such as a data transfer 
agreement or a national law of an EU member state. 
In parallel, there exists a special international agreement 
dictating how data on passenger names collected by air carriers 
would be shared and managed between the EU countries and the 
U.S.321  Another special agreement between the EU and the United 
States was concluded in order to secure adequate data protection 
in SWIFT transaction. 322   The U.S. Treasury Department may 
                                                     
320  The negotiations aim also to limit how and for what purposes the data 
can be transferred and processed, as well as the conditions for and the duration of 
the retention of the data.  How Will the EU’s Data Protection Reform Simplify the 
Existing Rules?, EUR. COMM’N, available at http://ec.europa.eu /justice/data-
protection/document/review2012/factsheets/6_en.pdf.  
321  Compare Agreement Between the United States of America and the 
European Union on the Processing and Transfer of Passenger Name Record 
(PNR) Data by Air Carriers to the United States Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) (2007 PNR agreement), July 26, 2007, available at 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy/pnr-
2007agreement-usversion.pdf (binding the EU to ensure that air carriers operating 
passenger flights to and from the USA will make available to the Department of 
Homeland Security passenger data), with Council Decision 2012/472/EU, of 26 
April 2012 on the Conclusion of the Agreement Between the United States of 
America and the European Union on the Use and Transfer of Passenger Name 
Records to the United States Department of Homeland Security, 2012 O.J. (L 215) 
4.  The period during which PNR data may be stored and used is reduced from 
fifteen to ten years for transnational serious crimes.  PNR data is stored for fifteen 
years for terrorism, and all data should be anonymized after six months.  The 
agreement shall remain in force until 2019.  
322  Council Decision 2010/412/EU, on the Conclusion of the Agreement 
Between the European Union and the United States of America on the Processing 
and Transfer of Financial Messaging Data from the European Union to the United 
States for the Purposes of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program, 2010 O.J. (L 
195) 3 (discussing the conclusion of the agreement between the EU and the U.S. on 
the processing and transfer of Financial Messaging Data from the EU to the U.S. 
for the purposes of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program).  The Society for 
Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications is based in Belgium and is 
the processor for most of the global money transfers from European Banks.  The 
SWIFT Agreement is valid for five years, until August 2015.  Id. art. 3.  
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request financial data from SWIFT only under narrowly defined 
circumstances. 323   These concrete agreements present the 
advantage of defining narrowly the circumstances of retention and 
use of data allowing awareness of the persons concerned. 
A necessary accommodation to the realities of modern life, 
which means that individuals have to reveal personal information 
to third parties, does not mean that they are willing to give up their 
privacy entirely.  In a world of complex technology, it is unclear 
whether the distinction between “meta-data” and other 
information carries much weight. 324   As Justice Sotomayor 
observed about GPS monitoring of locational information in the 
Jones case, data on telephone calls can reveal “a wealth of detail” 
about an individual’s “familial, political, professional, religious, 
and sexual associations.”325  Defining privacy as a right to control 
who has access to a person means recognizing that the person is 
entitled to consent to any use of the information that concerns her. 
This is in accordance with a vision of privacy as deriving from the 
general concept of human dignity, which means that human beings 
are entitled to respect by the very fact that they are human beings. 
The need to narrowly define the circumstances of violation of data 
privacy is quintessential to the very legitimacy of the program.  
 
                                                     
323  Id. at 8.  The request must identify as clearly as possible the financial data, 
substantiate the necessity of the data, tailor the data as narrowly as possible to 
minimize the amount of data requested, and not seek any data relating to the 
Single Euro Payments Area.  The department must store the financial data in a 
secure physical environment where they are accessed only by analysts 
investigating terrorism or its financing, and the financial data must not be 
interconnected with any other database.  Id. at 8.  
324  See July 13 Version: International Principles on the Application of Human 
Rights to Communications Surveillance, NECESSARY AND PROPORTIONATE (July 10, 
2013), available at http://en.necessaryandproportionate.org/text (discussing the 
relationship between privacy rights and the current digital surveillance 
technologies).  The Committee commissioned by the president recommends that 
the government should commission a study of the legal and policy options for 
assessing the distinction between metadata and other types of information.  See 
LIBERTY REPORT, supra note 93, at 120. 
325  United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring) (noting calling data reveals “trips to the psychiatrist, the plastic 
surgeon, the abortion clinic, the AIDS treatment center, the strip club, the criminal 
defense attorney, the by-the-hour motel, the union meeting, the mosque, 
synagogue or church, the gay bar and on and on”) (internal quotations omitted) 
(citation omitted).  
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